The Role of Science in Persuasion

Aa short discourse on the role of science in persuasion.

The Background

Science has a special place in the expert-role in public persuasion in the late twentieth century, perhaps rivaled only in history by the control exerted by the Christian Church in the Middle ages in Europe.[1] The Church was able to allege that it was able to unearth the “Truth” from insights into a reality that was totally independent. This authority was believed to have been grounded in the very nature of everything. The growth of modern science and the reformation began to erode this once infallible position and Christians became restive over the abuse of power both within and by the church. The “One Church” became many and science and reason was ascendant. Sensory observation provided the data and reason made it reasonable. Public experience and rationality became the cornerstones of truth, and scientific and objective became synonymous - “If I could see the yellow Forsythia bush, you probably could as well”. The subjective was relegated to the unscientific and even beyond the scope of reason. In the early debate over the ozone issue we see the essence of this argument played out in a strictly late-twentieth century issue. There are echoes in this story of Galileo and many of the other subsequent challenges to all types of “current dogma.”

The Context

The biosphere of our planet is protected from the harmful effects of Ultra-Violet (UV) rays in sunlight by a thin layer of ozone gas floating approximately 12 to 50 km (8 to 30 miles) above the surface of the earth[2]. In 1974 scientific evidence was published which suggested that chlorine atoms released from industrially-made chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) a commonly used aerosol and refrigerant gas, could float up to the stratosphere, cleave these ozone molecules and degrade this thin but crucial protective screen[3]. This idea remained a chemical hypothesis until 1985 when significant and unpredicted losses in stratospheric ozone were discovered over 26 million km2 covering Antarctica in the Southern Hemisphere. In the intervening decade from 1974 to 1985, the CFC-producing industry had engaged in a complex effort to discredit the relevant scientific process, distract policy makers and the public while claiming that CFCs were completely safe. The first ozone-hole report and other unequivocal evidence from atmospheric science gave strong impetus to the signing of an international environmental treaty, the Montreal Protocol (1987), to control the use of CFCs. In this period industry appeared to completely change its position, moved to find safe substitutes and seemed to comply with public and scientific opinion. Except that initially certain CFC compounds were simply renamed in an attempt to escape the strictures of the Montreal and subsequent agreements. The Montreal Accords have been celebrated as the most successful of more than a dozen international scientific treaties signed during the past two decades. It is unique for several reasons: in allowing for new scientific data to change some provisions, for the short amount of time it took to develop, and it was formulated on the basis of predictive science rather than in response to evidence of environmental damage[4]. Some public figures and opinion leaders such as Talk Show host Rush Limbaugh still absolutely dispute the scientific evidence and something of an ozone backlash has developed in the US in particular[5].With the recent political shift in the US Congress there is even some discussion about targeting the Montreal Accords

In this paper I propose to examine some of the methods of persuasion employed by each group in this unique intersection of environmental science, public policy and the industrial market-place.

A structure for the analysis

The overall frame for this discourse was set in place early on, in fact almost as soon as the initial scientific evidence was presented. Industry in the US challenged the implications of the findings and then resorted to a prolonged dispute with the scientific community. They poured millions of dollars into this enterprise and successfully held off governmental regulation. The response in Britain was slightly different. Industry and government had much closer links in the UK and the scientific community had a more muted response. I will frame this discourse as a two level negotiation. At level 1 there was Industry, Scientists and Government regulators engaged in a three-way discussion, with some overlapping interests between Scientists and Government and a range of parties with different interests at level 2, including the Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) and other government groups, the public, other scientists and environmental Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The interchange between these two levels has been characterized by framing on both sides, propaganda and official and unofficial persuasion. The discourse was complex and shifted focus with each new development. Because of its particular success and global acceptance, the Montreal Protocol has been reviewed through a number of analytical lenses, including Environmental Science, Politics and International Diplomacy. I have chosen to treat it in relatively little detail in this discussion. No analysis has attempted to examine how the debate was framed in persuasion and propaganda terms, as a common underlying structure.

The chemical compounds

CFCs were first developed in the 1930s by General Motors as a replacement for Ammonia and Sulphur dioxide, both hazardous compounds and used as refrigerants in the refrigeration industry. CFCs are non-toxic, inert, and easy to liquefy. The most widely used CFCs (CFC-11 and CFC-12) have the highest ozone depletion capacity and estimated life spans of 63 and 107 years. The range varies from 27 years for CFC-22 to 385 years for CFC-115. After the signing of the Montreal Protocol, a new naming system appeared. On 5 January 1988, Du Pont first publicly used the term “hydrogen chlorofluorocarbon” (HCFC)[6]. During the negotiations to the agreement distinctions were made between the various chemicals and parties chose to regulate only the most potent of the ozone depletors. HCFCs such as HCFC-22 contains hydrogen atoms and are less inert than CFCs, tending to decompose more rapidly in the lower atmosphere before they can rise high enough to reach the ozone layer. The industry then began to adopt a nomenclature with three divisions: fully halogenated CFCs; partially halogenated CFCs containing some hydrogen atoms, hence HCFCs; and, non-chlorine containing CFCs called HFCs. The Montreal Protocol regulates only the fully halogenated CFCs and their brominated relatives (halons-1211, -1301 and - 2402). The numbering system is non-standard but consistent and refers to the number of hydrogen, carbon and fluorine atoms.

The Scientists and the science

Mario Molina joined Sherwood Rowland’s laboratory as a Post-Doctoral fellow in October 1973. Rowland had not studied CFCs before but had some money to channel towards some work on these compounds. He proposed to Molina that they follow up on their mutual interest in the fate of CFCs under UV. They agreed to a general methodology and then set about doing the project. They determined that there were no significant sinks for these compounds below the stratosphere and they confirmed some other measurements of the rates at which CFCs absorb UV. They determined that CFCs drift in the atmosphere for between 40 and 150 years before that are eventually broken down by UV. They had also determined that when CFCs breakdown a free atom of chlorine is produced. They almost published their findings up to this point and then decided to ask one more question: what happened to this chlorine atom? Within three days and after a large amount of calculations Molina found that each chlorine atom could react catalytically with “tens of hundreds of thousands” of ozone molecules and destroy them [7] (p. 181): they had formulated the crux of the paper that they would submit to the journal Nature. They spent the next three months conferring with colleagues to ensure that they had not overlooked some crucial aspect. Rowland wrote the paper in early January 1974 and submitted as planned. They realized the portentous nature of their discovery and deliberately chose to submit through the peer-review process. The paper finally appeared on 28 June 1974, delayed by the difficulty of finding suitably qualified reviewers. The journal requested that news of this theory be embargoed up until publication date. Nervously expectant, Rowland and Molina were stunned by the media silence: the problem was too complicated for the public to grasp the implications. Finally, at a press conference at the American Chemical Society meetings in September 1974, the media took up the story.

What the government did

The convening of a group called “Committee on the Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere” (IMOS) constituted proof that the White House had taken the problem seriously. A one-day hearing was scheduled on 27 February 1975, and Rowland and Harvard’s Michael McElroy, a renowned atmospheric chemist, disagreed about the problem: McElroy thought that the theory was in some doubt and the problem was not so severe as Rowland and Molina would suggest. Another chemist pointed out that the real issue was that this was a public policy problem and not a scientific disagreement. The IMOS committee heads, Carroll Pegler Bastian and Warren Muir, then set about figuring out the jurisdiction problems that would have to be unraveled around formulating and implementing policy related to CFCs in the Federal Government. They released a report in June 1975 that handed a definitive directive to the National Academy of Science (NAS) to determine whether CFCs were hazardous or not. They suggested that aerosols cans containing CFCs be labeled as such, and recommended that Congress pass the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to be able to control CFCs as a hazardous substance. The IMOS report dismayed the industry but it responded characteristically: Du Pont scientist Richard Ward told the Los Angeles Times that the “report essentially concurs with the industry’s position that there is no appreciable danger in continued use of the fluorocarbon compounds while studies are completed”[8] (p. 41). The US reaction was portrayed as premature and overblown by the British Science weekly New Scientist. The US House and Senate commenced hearings to try to develop legislation to clean up the bureaucratic entanglement. Several hearings were held in 1975 -1976. Dale Bumpers employed William Moomaw as a scientific advisor. Moomaw had a Ph.D. in photochemistry and was able to assess the scientific arguments thoroughly. He remarked on one occasion “It was interesting to me as a scientist to hear [industry representatives] refer to it disparagingly as “the theory”. To a scientist a theory is sort of the pinnacle of the intellectual accomplishment. To industry, theory meant nothing more than your speculation versus my speculation”[9] (p. 45). Some subcommittee members were suspicious of the scientists motives. They wondered if they weren’t trying to drum up money for research. Bumpers got a commitment from Roy Schuyler about the extent of proof necessary before DuPont would withdraw Freons: “if it were not refutable, and if the data were reasonable and right and could be sustained, they would withdraw it”[10]. Eventually an amendment to the Clean Air Act was passed giving the EPA authority to regulate the chemicals if they were found to be dangerous. During the periods 1974-76, 1981, and 1987-1990 Du Pont testified a total of 8 times (on average once per year) at house hearings on this issue. In contrast, the NCA testified about acid-rain issues 21 times in 64 hearings over the same period of time.[11]

The Council for Atmospheric Sciences was an industry group organized to lobby for CFC production, fearing that state legislation could snowball into national legislation. Once the IMOS report was released the Industry had to take stock. The American Chemical Society (ACS) meeting in April 1975 had a special session on Ozone and CFC and it ran all day. The intense media coverage portrayed this as an Industry vs. Science battle and stoked the fires. Industry people whose jobs were threatened couldn’t understand why these compounds were suddenly a threat after they had been around for all these years. Many blamed the Media for exaggeration. The first ACS Press conference on the Rowland-Molina theory the previous year had Du Pont Scientists interrupting other speakers and dominating the proceedings. They asked combative non-media types of questions. Molina had learnt by this meeting how to handle the Press more effectively. He was more gentle and humorous. Rowland was infinitely patient with reporters and very able to speak their language. The press conference was a success for scientists - one reporter even acknowledged that they had a field day. Because of this, both were accused by Industrialist Robert Abplanalp of having run to the media. He saw their advocacy as inappropriate for a scientist and even complained in writing to the Chancellor of the University of California, Robert Aldrich, complaining about Rowland. Aldrich defended Rowland as doing the job he was paid to do.

In July 1975 researchers in the Antarctic using high-flying aircraft and balloon-borne measuring devices, detected CFCs 15 miles above the earth in the stratosphere confirming that the CFCs drifted up through the troposphere. These findings also provided partial confirmation that UV was cleaving the molecules because the amount of CFCs declined with altitude in the stratosphere almost exactly as predicted by the computer models[12]. A few months later several groups of scientists confirmed that CFCs dissociated by Ultra-violet light and gave off chlorine. This new evidence was then reported to the Senate Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere in September. Industry’s only remaining argument was that there was no proof that chlorine would initiate a chain reaction that would destroy huge amounts of ozone. Detection of chlorine oxide would be definitive proof. Then a controversy arose about the role of chlorine nitrate. Chlorine nitrate could be formed when chlorine oxide was linked with nitrogen oxides. By tying up chlorine, less ozone would be destroyed than the amount predicted by Rowland and Molina. This was brought to public attention by Rowland and Molina themselves and they were applauded for having the courage to be self-critical. Rowland later explained,”We understood that we had a terrific responsibility, because we did not see sufficient scientific competence in our opposition. If there were flaws in the theory, we would have to find them ourselves.”[13] (p. 207).

This delayed the NAS report-back for five months and legislators wanted a strong go-ahead to act on amendments to the Clean-Air Act. The NAS released two reports: One came out clearly supporting the hypothesis of Rowland and Molina that CFCs were going to damage the ozone layer, producing losses of between 2 and 20 percent and that more UV light would reach the earth’s surface as a result. The second report advised the government that it should wait two more years and gather more evidence before issuing regulations. The industry’s Council on Atmospheric Sciences placed an advertisement in newspapers around the country one week later, quoting the NAS report, that stated : ” ‘We wish to recommend against a decision to regulate at this time.’We agree!” [14] (p. 81). However, one month later the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed a phase-out of all non-essential uses of CFCs in food, drugs and cosmetics. The EPA followed suit with a similar announcement. Du Pont officials were outraged: “We find the FDA’s intent to establish a timetable for phasing out fluorocarbon aerosols astonishing. When NAS wrote in its report ‘we recommend against the decision to regulate as this time’, the academy clearly recommended against this kind of action that FDA is planning.”[15] (p.85). The regulations generally affected the spray can industry only and the aerosol industry suffered very little from the 1977 ban. Spray-can sales fell from about 3 billion to 2.3 billion.

The Montreal Protocol (1987)

The essence of these meetings was a carried over fight form the Vienna Framework Convention (1985). The EC/Japan/Soviet Union resisted a control protocol because they feared that it favored American Industries. The Toronto group (Canada, Nordic Countries, Switzerland and US) opposed the imposition of a capacity cap on the production. The capacity cap favored the EC because of excess capacity to continue expanding CFC use for another 20 years. It would also have had the effect of locking in market shares and so would have constituted a serious disadvantage to US industries, which were operating with little or no excess capacity. A combination of forceful diplomacy from the US and a change of heart on the part, notably, of the Soviet Union and Germany brought agreement on a control and reduction targets.

Changing names

One effect of changing the names during the Montreal Protocol meetings (1987) was to enable some companies to make claims which are somewhat confusing, perhaps intentionally. McDonalds, for example distributed literature stating that its foam food packaging “is manufactured without [emphasis in original]the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which are thought to be harmful to the earth’s ozone layer”[16]. Some McDonalds packaging was, in fact, produced with HCFC-22, formerly called CFC-22, which is an ozone depleting chemical. Another example is provided by Du Pont’s marketing literature for a brand of aerosol propellants, “DYMEL”, one of which is HCFC-22. The literature contained the following statement: “Not regulated by federal laws restricting the use of chlorofluorocarbons in aerosols, Du Pont’s family of DYMEL propellants opens rich new opportunities for aerosol packagers. Environmentally safe and low in toxicity, DYMEL propellants can generate consumer preference and product marketability”[17] (p. 321). Moore observes that similar kinds of statements can be found on a wide range of consumer products, from cans of compressed HCFC-22 for cleaning electronic equipment to packages of CFC-22-blown foam products.

The Industry

The major industry players were Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) the largest CFC producer in Britain and Du Pont, the largest CFC producer in the USA.

The position of industry is astutely summarized in the following quote: “The difficulties in negotiating the Montreal Protocol had nothing to do with whether the environment was damaged or not. It was all who was going to gain an edge over whom; whether Du Pont would have an advantage over the European companies or not.”[18] In 1974 CFC industries generated $8 billion and employed 200 000 people[19]. According to Department of Commerce statistics for the same year the CFC production reached $500 million with a payroll of 600 000 jobs paying $6.7 billion. Another 1.5 million jobs were dependent on this industry.[20] In 1986 the annual value of goods and services dependent on CFCs exceeded $28 billion and more than 780 000 jobs were related to CFC uses[21]. They formed a lobbying organization called the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy in 1980. By the late fall in 1986 the Alliance had taken a clear strong stand against premature regulation. Throughout the intergovernmental and the international negotiations in 1986 and 1987 the Alliance publicized the likely cost to the American consumer of capping or banning CFC production and use. They employed a prestigious energy consulting firm, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett (PHB) to develop a range of estimates of the costs of regulating CFCs based on the types of limits under discussion. PHB came up with a report forecasting substantial economic dislocation, including declines in the performance and quality of some electronic parts to the elimination of some packaging businesses. Private American industries are mandated by Congress to be consulted by the State and Commerce Departments and the Office of the Special Trade Representative on most international trade negotiations. Ignoring a lobby group creates a real risk of not getting an agreement ratified. The chief US negotiator Richard Benedick had to make sure that he took the Alliance’s viewpoint into consideration even though he disagreed with the thrust of many of the statements made by them.[22]

How the Industry portrayed itself

From a scientific point of view, industry had very little ammunition after the release of the IMOS report in June 1975. The refrigerator industry, aerosols market, deodorant packagers all suffered. Shipments of aerosol cans were already down 25% in the first half of 1975. Industry came across looking like villains, while scientists on the side of the ban looked like the heroes. In May 1975 Sol Ganz, president of New York Bronze Powder Company received a letter from a young girl signed by twenty three of her friends. In it they told of their fears of getting cancer and that Susan’s horse was about to have a foal and the foal will be alive in the year 2000 and that she would have to shoot her, all because of spray cans. He attacked the aerosol industry for not effectively rebutting the anti-aerosol publicity.

Then in June the Johnson Wax Company, the fifth largest manufacturer of aerosol products, announced its decision to end use of all CFC propellants in aerosols “in the interests of our customers during a period of uncertainty”[23] (p.59). Johnson’s move was characterized by one industry official as an attempt to gain some market advantage. An advertisement appeared for a new product saying “Problem perspiration? Concerned about aerosols? Totally honest non-aerosol anti-perspirant deodorant is the answer”. Ads such as this were excoriated by editors of Aerosol Age. An ad for Mennen’s “get on the stick” was awarded the prize for the most obnoxious commercial. “What is most amazing about this crude performance is that it is sponsored by an old-line, highly respected and conservative company, which, incidentally has been a leading marketer of aerosols” noted an editor in the journal Soap/Cosmetics/Chemical Specialties.[24] NRDC, at the New York State hearings on banning aerosol spray cans, pointed out (this went into the public record) that stick deodorants were more economical and gave the consumers more for their money.[25]

During the summer of 1975, Industry used an erudite and outspoken British scientist and former editor of International Journal of Air Pollution, Richard Scorer, to bolster publicity. He was suspicious of “the theory” and labeled Molina and Rowland “doomsayers”. Rowland’s response to him was to note that he was good at attacking but had never published any scientific papers on the subject. He was booked by his publicity firm to debate McElroy on “The Firing Line” but his appearance was not a success for Industry: he was out of his league in the face of McElroy’s scientific expertise.

Industry was more successful at fighting state legislation on aerosol bans. Du Pont spent millions on full-page advertisements knowing that environmental and consumer groups could never match them. The ads carried the message that aerosols have made life better for everyone and “We believe in what US Law holds clearly and we cherish dearly: you are innocent until proven guilty.”[26] (p.62) By November 1975, industry was not doing very well. Sales of aerosol containing products were incontrovertibly down, and in polls the public was recognizing the danger of CFCs to the environment. More disturbing was the finding that there was a lack of faith in American business ethics. The industry responded by attacking the Consumer Product Safety Commission, calling it the newest monster created by congress.

The Trans-Atlantic connection

In 1975, R. Schuyler of Du Pont told a US Senate hearing that restrictions on CFCs “would cause tremendous economic dislocation”[27]. Producers in the US, responding to consumer pressure, had moved to develop new propellants before the 1978 aerosol ban and these substitutes proved to be more economical than CFCs. Somehow the European producers were able to persuade their governments that replacement was unfeasible. The threat of patchwork state regulations made the industry publicly favor federal legislation to reduce the disruption.[28] American firms appeared more concerned about their public image than Europeans. US producers also resented that European rivals had gained a competitive edge in the late 1970’s by blocking meaningful EC regulation. US industry was strongly opposed to an EPA proposal to freeze non-aerosol uses and they repeatedly urged the EPA to maintain a level playing field. In September 1986, less than 3 months before the scheduled start of negotiations, the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, a coalition of 500 US producer and user companies, unexpectedly came out supporting international regulation of CFCs. Reflecting differences within the business community, the statement did not specify sets of controls, recommending instead more scientific research, conservation and development of substitutes. This broke a transatlantic united front on the eve of talks and caused consternation in Europe. Some Europeans suspected that the US was using a scare to cloak commercial motives. They claimed that the US was endorsing CFC control to enter the profitable EC export markets with profitable substitutes. According to Benedick, this suspicion was unfounded - Du Pont admitted that it had ceased research into alternatives 5 years earlier[29]. The primary objective of the European companies was to dominate the market for as long as possible to avoid the costs of switching to other products. They thought that the US producers had acted in haste and had only themselves to blame. European producers had much closer ties to government, even to the point of being part of official delegations to protocol negotiations - compared to the US industry who went in the capacity of unofficial observers. Some EU industrialists were privately trivializing the ozone threat and were openly cynical about the objectives of the negotiations.[30]

A 1975 advertisement in the New York Times said “The ozone layer vs. the aerosol industry: Du Pont wants to see them both survive”[31] (p. 321).

Then in 1976: “Du Pont industry heavyweight, leader in the holy crusade to save the aerosol, champion of economic growth, jobs, and scientific certainty, and enemy of the “rule of witchcraft where, by definition, the accusation proves the charge,” seemed especially nonchalant. In 1976, Du Pont sold about $250 million in CFCs, of which “only” about $50 million worth was for use as an aerosol propellant, a company spokesman pointed out. “That means that fluorocarbons accounted for about three percent of Du Pont’s total sales of $8.36 billion in 1976,” the spokesman continued, “while the aerosol propellant business represented roughly 0.5 percent of total sales. It wasn’t very significant.”[32] (p. 213)

In London in March 1991, the environmental manager for Fluorochemicals for Du Pont gave a seminar entitled “Du Pont’s response to the Stratospheric Ozone Issue”. The chronology (Figure 1) shows the official tone. Du Pont hosts Global CFC Symposium — What happens to CFCs. The accompanying text to this slide reads as follows: “Du Pont and industry globally have responded to credible science with appropriate policy changes and actions to deal with stratospheric ozone protection. As illustrated by these two graphics, alternative products have been brought to commercial reality much faster than “business as usual”. Lets look at the highlights.” The impression is clearly intended that Du Pont “changed policy” in 1986 to limit CFC growth/global regulation. Each of the years from 1988 after the Montreal Protocol, Du Pont has opened a new substitutes plant somewhere in the US, Canada or Britain. The subtitle to this slide is Du Pont & Industry Leadership. This slide is loaded with a range of subtle and persuasion-loaded meanings. The intention is clearly to give the impression of Du Pont acting responsibly and responding to science. They did indeed do so after the first real evidence of a hole in 1986, but had marshaled sophisticated resistance at every turn up to that point. More interesting is the unsubstantiated “as illustrated by these two graphics ….faster than “business as usual”. The intriguing question is: What standard is this being measured against? The rest of the talk is devoted to an introduction to the selection of alternative fluorocarbons and how the relative use of these will affect the chlorine load and its reduction under different scenarios. Vogelsberg reemphasized that CFCs should be phased out as soon as possible i.e. “..as soon as safe substitutes can be made available. CFCs should be conserved to the maximum extent practical during the transition and HCFCs should be viewed as transition substances to allow the rapid CFC phaseout.” [33] (p. 6)

Environmental NGOs

These took on a stronger role once the protocol was signed. Alongside a general plan to increase awareness, Environmental NGOs internationally set about pressuring governments that signed the Protocol to drastically strengthen the agreement when they met in June 1990. In October 1987 at a meeting in Amsterdam 33 affiliated groups of Friends of the Earth International passed a resolution of highest priority to make ozone-layer protection a top priority campaign. They designed campaign initiatives to bring citizen pressure to bear on industries that use CFCs and simultaneously increased support for tougher government action. In 1987, approximately 500 million spray cans were produced that contained CFCs and about 12 of these were used by each consumer per year. Consumer were given a leaflet listing CFC-free products and on the day that this guide was released campaigners dressed as aerosol cans dumped a slogan made with spray cans on the doorstep of ICI, Britain’s largest producer of CFCs. By the end of that year 40 000 leaflets had been distributed. Similar campaigns were launched in the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Australia, France, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia and some other countries. An organizing effort in the Netherlands was so successful that within three months the national aerosol manufacturers agreed with the Environment Ministry to stop using CFCs by the end of 1989. In return the environmentalists promised to ease up on negative publicity. Attention was also brought to bear on polystyrene foam packaging. CFCs were used to blow these into foams for drinking cups, egg cartons and fast food containers. Other activity targeted McDonalds persuading them to change to non-CFC blown agents and then used this as leverage to challenge and successfully pressure other major fast food companies with adverse publicity announcements at the Montreal conference. Much of this kind of activity was organized by Friends of the Earth (USA), with involvement from Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and Greenpeace. Their main goals were to educate the public and define a climate for tougher government action both domestically and internationally, by targeting domestic industrial sectors.[34]

The Public

On 1 February 1975, 43 million Americans watched the hit TV show All in the Family. The characters Mike and Gloria are arguing about having children. Mike did not want to bring children into a rapidly deteriorating world. Gloria pleaded that things were getting better. “Oh yeah,” replied Mike, picking up a can of her hair spray. “What about spray cans? Right here, this is a killer!…I read that there are gases inside these cans, Gloria, that shoot up in the air and destroy the ozone.”

Analysis

An essential ingredient in trying to unravel the details of this event is to understand the implicit power of the sophistication of the knowledge involved. Atmospheric science is extremely complex requiring a high level of understanding of atmospheric chemistry, complex mathematical modeling, climatology and oceanography. The concepts that were under dispute were all without exception very difficult to translate into non-specialist terms. Points of disagreement were embedded in this complex knowledge system and were equally difficult to translate. Translation, when it was attempted, usually resulted in some trivialization of the issue, and opened up an opportunity for exploitation to the advantage of one or other point of view. An example of this division: “the ozone debate” ([35] p.78).

The Backlash

The basis of the backlash revolves around concentrations of natural sources of chlorine in the stratosphere. The central question revolves around how these compare to man-made sources (CFCs) and the claim is that CFCs are insignificant. This claim is made in a book by Rogelio Maduro and Ralf Schauerhammer and taken up by former Atomic Energy Commissioner Dixy Lee Ray and, in turn, talk-show host Rush Limbaugh. Maduro and Schauerhammer calculated that 650 million tons of chlorine enter the atmosphere annually from sources on the surface of the earth, the majority from seawater. CFCs account for a mere 750 000 tons annually. Scientists both dispute Maduro and Schauerhammer’s figures and doubt whether this chlorine reaches the stratosphere. The reason for this unlikely scenario is that chlorine from natural sources is water soluble and so gets washed out of the atmosphere by rain. CFCs, however, are inert and stable and float up to the stratosphere where the chlorine atoms are released by UV radiation. When charged that these natural sources of chlorine don’t hold up under scrutiny, these backlash critics contend that volcanoes are an additional source. Here again they have chosen to misrepresent the available information. Volcanologists have made a range of estimates of the amount of chlorine produced from a volcanic eruption but, regardless of how much they might produce, the plumes from erupting volcanoes are several kilometers below the base of the stratosphere and do not penetrate it at all. Rowland asserts that atmospheric scientists decided 15 years ago to reject volcanoes as a significant source of chlorine for the stratosphere[36]. Ray, in her book Trashing the Planet seized on a quote from a paper by the volcanologist David Johnston in the journal Science. He suggested that “the eruption of the Bishop Tuff….in California 700 000 years ago may have injected 289 million tons of hydrogen chloride into the stratosphere, equivalent to about 570 times the 1975 world industrial production of chlorine fluorocarbons.” She mis-attributes the numbers to the 1976 Mount St. Augustine eruption and Limbaugh, in turn, mis-attributes similar numbers to the Mount Pinatubo eruption. Limbaugh explains that he gets his facts from Ray’s book which he describes as “the most footnoted, documented book” he has ever read. Maduro is an associate editor of 21st Century & Technology, a magazine published by supporters of Lyndon LaRouche. 21st Century has circulated a petition citing Maduro’s arguments and calling for the repeal of the Montreal Protocol. A Nobel prize-winning chemist at Texas A&M, Derek Barton, is among those in the scientific community who have signed it.

Maduro and Schauerhammer have written a book entitled The Holes in the Ozone Scare: The Scientific Evidence That the Sky Isn’t Falling also published by 21st Century. Atmospheric researchers who have read parts of the book said that they could see how non-experts could be swayed by the arguments. According to these scientists, the book is based on out-dated scientific papers, and selective results taken out of context. Rowland described the book as “a good job of collecting all the bad papers [in the field] in one place”[37] (p. 1581). Maduro’s response is that Rowland and other critical scientists “have systematically ignored all the massive research which debunks elements of their theory.”[38] (p. 1581). Maduro and Limbaugh brand any formal attempt to debate them by researchers as part of a massive conspiracy to ignore or bury any contradictory findings to their theory. In their book, Maduro and Schauerhammer accuse their opponents of deliberately distorting the facts about ozone research and of being “in top posts with command power over scientific journals and associations and, ultimately, public opinion.”[39] (p. 1582). Publicity materials for the book call for “overthrow of the murderous environmentalist regime now ruling our schools, governing institutions and the media” [40] (p. 6).

This backlash continues to develop even as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has released data for 1994 and 1995 showing that depletion over the poles had exceeded predicted rates of ozone loss for the past three years, along with record losses over Antarctica. Some models from National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) even suggest that ozone depletion is triggering self-reinforcing depletion cycles leading to geometric rates of losses. In 1993 vehicle manufacturers managed to bring pressure to bear on the Clinton Administration to persuade Du Pont to continue producing CFCs for a full year beyond the date on which they had publicly committed themselves to cease domestic manufacture. The reason given was that vehicle makers had not done sufficient work to find alternatives for automobile air-conditioners.

The Institute for Energy and Environment Research recently called for the worldwide elimination of HCFCs by 1996. Such demands are not well received by Du Pont nor by many of the parties to the Montreal Protocol. The Protocol is now pushing these substitutes, that it backed through a fund administered by the World Bank, to developing countries to help them circumvent the use of CFCs. But 75% of the grants went to projects that use CFCs and HCFCs, despite the Bank’s own advisors recommending cyclopentane, an ozone-safe compound with little global warming potential. A further twist in this situation is shown by the membership of the advisory panel on grant making to the Bank, the Ozone Operations Resource Group (OERG). It consists of seven representatives, all closely associated with the chemical industry, two of whom are employees of ICI. The dominance of the industry is also evident in the conference of the parties to the Montreal Accords, where economic terms rather than environmental terms dominate the discussion. Passacantando and Carothers quote one top US representative to the meeting as saying “[ozone depletion] is not an environmental issue. It’s an economic issue.”(p.7)

Passacantando and Carothers suggest that the highest priority for industry is to resist controls on HCFCs and other CFC substitutes. “In this, they have undoubtedly been well served by the mood of doubt and complacency engendered by the ozone backlash.”…. “it is time the environmental movement retook the initiative, countering the propaganda peddled by Limbaugh, Ray and Maduro, and exposing the agenda of those corporations who are now sheltering in the lee of the backlash.”(p. 7).

One final twist:

Du Pont recently approached Greenpeace with an offer to help deal with the backlash publicity if Greenpeace was willing to endorse some of the work Du Pont was doing trying to develop alternatives and its effort to convert the Industry to using them. Not surprisingly, Greenpeace declined.[41]

  1. [1] Trigg, R. 1993. Rationality and Science : Can Science explain Everything? Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
  2. [2] Roan, S.1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  3. [3] Molina, M.J. and Rowland, F.S. 1974. Stratospheric sink for chlorofluoro-methanes: Chlorine atom catalysed destruction of Ozone. Nature, 249, 810-812.
  4. [4] Benedick,R.E. 1991. Ozone Diplomacy. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA.
  5. [5] Passacantando,J and Carothers, A. 1995. Crises? What Crisis?: The Ozone Backlash. The Ecologist, Vol. 25(1).
  6. [6] Moore,C.A. 1990. Industry Responses to the Montreal Protocol. Ambio 19(6-7): 320 - 323
  7. [7] Cagin S. and Dray, P. 1993. Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs changed our world and endangered the Ozone layer.New York: Pantheon Books.
  8. [8] Roan, S. 1989. ibid.
  9. [9]Roan, S. 1989. ibid.
  10. [10]Roan, S. 1989. ibid.
  11. [11]Dickson,N. 1995. Personal Communication, April 1995.
  12. [12] Roan, S. 1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  13. [13] Cagin S. and Dray, P. 1993. Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs changed our world and endangered the Ozone layer. New York: Pantheon Books.
  14. [14] Roan, S. 1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  15. [15] Roan, S. 1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  16. [16] Moore,C.A. 1990. Industry Responses to the Montreal Protocol. Ambio 19(6-7): 320 - 323
  17. [17] Moore,C.A. 1990. Industry Responses to the Montreal Protocol. Ambio 19(6-7): 320 - 323
  18. [18] Mostafa Tolba, quoted in Deborah MacKenzie, 1988. Now it makes Business Sense to Save the Ozone Layer, New Scientist October 29, p. 25.
  19. [19] Roan, S. 1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  20. [20] Roan, S. 1989. ibid
  21. [21] Barnett, R. 1986. Ozone Protection: the need for a global solution. EPA Journal, December.
  22. [22] Goodman, A.E. 1988. The negotiations leading to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone layer. Case #447. Pew Program in case teaching and writing in international affairs. University of Pittsburgh.
  23. [23] Roan, S.1989. ibid (quoting Samuel C. Johnson Chairman and CEO of Johnson.
  24. [24] Roan, S. 1989. ibid
  25. [25] Roan, S. 1989. Ozone Crises. New Tork: Wiley Science Editions. 270 pp.
  26. [26] Roan, S. 1989. ibid
  27. [27] Benedick, R.E.
  28. [28]Lewis, T. 1989. The long and the short. New York Times, 11 May
  29. [29]Brodeur,P. 1986. Annals of Chemistry: In the face of doubt. New Yorker 62 (16), 9 June.
  30. [30] Benedick,R.E.
  31. [31] Moore,C.A. 1990. Industry Responses to the Montreal Protocol. Ambio 19(6-7): 320 - 323
  32. [32] Cagin S. and Dray, P. 1993. Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs changed our world and endangered the Ozone layer. New York: Pantheon Books.
  33. [33] Vogelsberg, F.A. 1991. Du Pont’s response to the Stratospheric Ozone Issue. Talk given in London March 12 -13.
  34. [34] Cook,E. 1990. Global Environmental Advocacy: Citizen activism in protecting the Ozone layer. Ambio 19(6-7): 334 - 338.
  35. [35] Brodeur,P. 1986. Annals of Chemistry: In the face of doubt. New Yorker 62 (16), 9 June.
  36. [36]Rowland, F.S. 1993. President’s Lecture: The Need for Scientific Communication with the Public.Science 260: 1571 - 1574.
  37. [37] Taubes, g. 1993. The ozone Backlash. Science 260: 1580 - 1583.
  38. [38] Taubes, g. 1993. The ozone Backlash. Science 260: 1580 - 1583.
  39. [39] Taubes, g. 1993. The ozone Backlash. Science 260: 1580 - 1583.
  40. [40] Passacantando,J and Carothers, A. 1995. Crises? What Crisis?: The Ozone Backlash. The Ecologist, Vol. 25(1).
  41. [41] Duchin, M. 1995. Personal telephone communication. May1995.

This entry was posted on Monday, May 15th, 1995 at 12:00 pm and is filed under Writing.