1. Introduction

In many parts of the planet the natural environment is showing signs of stress. Awareness of the importance of this brought many nations together at Stockholm in 1972 and again at Rio twenty years later. During these two decades the global community passed more than a dozen international treaties, some of which are more effective than others. These treaties and a range of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations represent emerging new forms of governance that are challenging and transforming established notions of sovereignty [1]. Since the second World War there has been a rapid rise in the number of these institutions (Table 1). Much of the formal interaction of all these organizations is conducted through the process of multilateral negotiations. Table 1. Number of International organizations in three different years during this century (after Zacher 1992[2]

	1909	1951	1986
Intergovernmental organizations	37	123	337
Non-governmental organizations	176	832	4649

Most diplomatic negotiation up until the beginning of this century was conducted in secret, usually among a small group (except for some very unusual events such as the Congress of Vienna in 1815), and at a slow pace with no deadlines.A major shift occurred with the treaty of Versailles (1919-1921) and the advent of public, large group negotiations working towards a deadline [3]. The number of conferences and congresses soared from about 100 per year in 1900 to more than 3000 per year in the 1970s. Bilateral treaties have doubled from approximately 6 500 in the post second-world war decade to about 14 000 in 1975[4]. These have dealt with a wide array of security, trade, cultural and environmental issues. Most treaty-making has been conducted under increasing public scrutiny because of the domestic ramifications of such agreements. The emerging system of international negotiation has seen the transformation of negotiation from government-to-government through appointed negotiators into a technically and politically complex exercise involving citizens groups, non-governmental organizations, and technical and scientific specialists.As a part of the evolving nature of sovereignty and governance, this process of change in negotiation is part of the general change in global power patterns (for example, the demise of the Soviet Union), the growth of alliances (for example, the Europe Union) and interests (for example, the G77 countries) and the recognition of environmental problems (for example, ozone depletion). This has given rise to the need for better management of the negotiations and especially a deeper understanding of the multilateral negotiating process. In this paper I explore how and why an informal meeting structure should be formally integrated with larger formal negotiation processes, with special application to environmental agreements. Similar workshop models have been employed in conflict resolution and second-track diplomacy, and in a handful of instances in environmental negotiations. Environmental treaties are different from other types of international instruments. The complex technical nature of the underlying science can prove to be a hindrance, lead to overgeneralizations to achieve consensus, and thus reduce the effectiveness of the agreement. This stems in part from the difficulty that a given country might experience in grasping the full ramifications and implications of a given agreement and, in turn, leads to concerns about the existence of invisible asymmetries within in the treaty that could unfairly burden certain parties. Particular components of the agreement have to be carefully crafted to make them workable and acceptable to all parties in a given negotiation, thus helping to bolster its subsequent authority.

2.What makes international environmental treaties different?

International environmental agreements are generally like other types of multilateral agreements. They contain the various features of bilateral processes such as bargaining, information exchange, decision making rules and the articulation of interests and options. But these all require augmentation for multilateral processes, with a deeper understanding of coalition formation, differentiation of interests and roles, and different meeting structures. The process and constraints of a given negotiation also alter the process internally as a negotiation unfolds and this introduces another set of challenges [5]. Environmental negotiations also have particular characteristics which set them apart from other multilateral treaties. In particular they have types of political and scientific uncertainties with more ambiguous alternatives, and there are sequencing issues and characteristic coalitional behavior. Lang (1991)[6] identifies four characteristics which set environmental negotiations apart from other types of agreements. First, regional or interest groups exist and these can unite delegations geographically or politically. With increasing involvement as the negotiations unfold, they tend to coalesce around particular political positions in the larger conference context. Groups such as this can be useful because they can serve in the basic conference role functions.They can also serve as working groups or sub-groups trying to settle issues by informal consultation, thus serving as negotiating units. An advantage of informal consultation is that, since positions taken are not subject to public scrutiny, parties might change position without losing face. A major disadvantage, however, is that the evolution of a negotiation may be recorded later by a particular participant viewing it through subjective recollection. Nevertheless, according to Lang, the most substantive bargaining has been carried out in this informal context. Second, environmental negotiations have tended to be fairly transparent. Such negotiations have experienced sophisticated lobbying by NGOs: two notable examples are the negotiations of the Montreal accords and the work of Greenpeace in the Basel Convention on movements of hazardous waste. The media generally have served the environmental lobbies well and have served to both educate and to heighten the level of public concern. Third, in a discussion of material factors, Lang suggests that scientific evidence of actual or potential environmental damage has been crucial. This has usually led to examination of the credibility of such evidence during the bargaining process. Groups of scientific experts have substantially assisted conferences drafting legal instruments. Scientific evidence also has competed with considerations of economic feasibility. Finally, according to Lang, environmental treaties have generally not been closed on conclusion and contain re-opening clauses either for new controls or the incorporation of new scientific evidence.Frequently, they have been completed in steps, beginning with a framework followed with increasingly stringent requirements subsequently. I would add to this list a fifth characteristic. Environmental treaties aim to solve a common environmental problem on a regional or global scale and have the appearance of being in essence a problem solving exercise. (Trade or security issues appear more adversarial and are accepted as such in the media.) However, environmental issues often have far reaching implications affecting each country’s domestic economy and politics: this contradiction instills a specific tension into the process which requires some creative management both between domestic constituencies and their conference representatives on the one hand and among parties at the conference on the other [7]. Ignoring this tension can easily result in sub-optimal agreements.

3. International environmental treaties are mostly ineffective.

Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, public concern with environmental degradation and recognition of the link between poverty, population growth and the environment have propelled nations to take some action. Since then, fifteen international environmental treaties have been negotiated, signed and implemented [8]. On balance, these treaties, in spite of the positive aspects of having brought a large group of countries to negotiate and agree, contain a variety of weaknesses. Two of the more successful negotiations include air pollution control (LRTAP) under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in 1983 and the Montreal Agreement and amendments to protect the ozone layer in 1988 [9]. Two relative successes, however, does not offer an optimistic promise of more successful future agreements. Susskind [10] identified four major weaknesses of global environmental negotiation. All were characterized by: 1) no guarantees of fair treatment for all countries and interests through the current voting and representation system; 2) unbalanced scientific and political considerations; 3) minimal linkage among environmental and other policy issues, and 4) ineffective monitoring and enforcement of agreements. Furthermore, these specific weaknesses are connected to three underlying global obstacles which sabotage resolution:escalating North-South tensions; sovereignty vs. multilateral tensions; and, free-rider problems, that is, an absence of incentives to bring parties to the table. Susskind [11] suggests that the substance of both sets of issues could be pragmatically addressed by, first, making changes to the international legal structure to permit legal recognition of non-governmental organizations as legal parties and the establishement of international environmental rights; second, by changing the voting and representation system to reduce the dominance of a few powerful nations; third, by curtailing the misuse of scientific and technical information to advance short-term national interests; fourth, by managing linkage issues with dexterity during treaty-negotiation; and fifth, by dealing more effectively with issues of compliance in the face of sovereignty. This last point is particularly important. Traditionally, nation-states have had a monopoly as actors in negotiations.This has extended, as mentioned in the introduction, to international organizations, transboundary and multinational corporations and industrial units, political parties and movements, and social and religious communities. The actual bargaining, however, is still based on issues of sovereignty:an agreement usually means the partial suspension of each sides’ sovereignty in order to follow points of the agreed-upon contract. This tension between the traditional notion of sovereignty and a contemporary attempt to problem-solve and cooperate is a central underlying reason for stalemates at worst and ineffective treaties at best. Susskinds recommendations are far-reaching and substantively detailed, addressing environmental policy, negotiation process and negotiation structure. My proposal to use informal, problem-solving style meetings as a part of the structure and process of an environmental negotiation is fully consonant with these ideas and recommendations.

3. Using informal meetings as a part of environmental negotiations.

Informal meetings are a wholly practical device to formalize a structure that has been sporadically used in a number of different negotiating arenas. As a device, it is intended to be focussed yet adaptable in function. It could be used in prenegotiation phases for the purposes of clarifying initial positions and interests or for exploring and developing options (bundles and linkages).It could be also used directly for negotiation when coalitions have developed and coalitional interests need to be explored, or, when particular issues in the negotiation are proving intractable, informal meetings could provide a format to problem-solve outside of the main course of the negotiation meeting. In searching for a practical and theoretically useful model for informal meetings, I found four types which appear to have some facet of value for environmental negotiations. As would be expected, aspects of each model are also clearly inapplicable.These are: a recent policy dialogue on Trade and Environment; scientific workshops used very sporadically in environmental treaties; problem-solving workshops in ethnic conflict; and, second-track diplomacy. The argument for using conflict resolution models in informal meetings is partially addressed by Zartman [12]. He observes that there are at least two different ways of viewing environmental conflict: “one considers the problem as the adversary and seeks to negotiate with it” (p. 114), and the other recognizes that parties benefit asymmetrically from its solution - “problem solving then is not merely discovery and education, but dealing with motivated, interested conflict inherent in both the problem and its solution.” (p. 114). He sees most envirornmental negotiation as being more like the second case and becoming increasingly so in the future. Most effective agreements, in his opinion, have had an incremental quality. Agreements shift from initial agreements with more tentative language to more assertive and clear goals and what Zartman calls a “fall forward” capacity whereby, with new information, more stringent requirements are agreed to in subsequent Conferences of parties. This incremental stringency pushes parties into more polarized stances.Zartman’s analysis is only partially credible because he asserts in his conclusions that “the environmental process has, in general, been remarkably smooth and productive..” (p. 121). As I outlined above, most international environmental treaties fall short of their intended goals. Even though one could argue that the informal meetings should be considered apart from the formal structure in order for them fulfil their function, I think that Zartman is correct in suggesting that participants would be unlikely to put the adversarial aspects of the negotiation aside. I use scientific/technical workshops as a model because they were essentially value-creating and educational in the context of the negotiations where they were discussed. The policy dialogue serves as model more for a structure for informal meetings, although it also provides some guidance for process. Before describing these models I outline a brief history of negotiation theory to provide some theoretical integration for the use of informal meetings in an existing historical framework.

4. Historical framework

Informal meetings are an extension of the development of negotiation structures and processes. The theory of integrative bargaining can be attributed to Mary Parker Follett in a cited 1942 paper[13]. Since then a substantial formal body of theory has been developed and explored. Schelling (1960)[14] analysed negotiation theoretically based on “Prisoners Dilemma”: a typical negotiation starts with a minimum of cooperation initially and progresses to a maximum at the conclusion.The gist was to overcome the conflict and time was not critical. Raiffa (1982) title=”">[15] suggested that distributive approaches are necessary for economically “efficient” outcomes - both parties have not strategically misrepresented their value trade-offs and thus not missed “costless” gains. A clear competitive strategy is more likely to win in the long run over meaness and trickery. More recently Axelrod[16] (1984) examined joint problem solving and the use of a “tit-for-tat” strategy. Arbatov (1988) in Kremenyuk [17] analysed the negative aspects of the traditional approach which he divided into three specific components: 1) protracted bargaining; 2) the complexity of domestic negotiation and its influence on higher rank negotiation; and 3) bureaucratization of the talks.Successful negotiations followed a generally hierarchical structure where at the highest level differences in principles were resolved, followed by a legal level, then an expert level and finally, at the lowest, an implementation level. In examining the decoding of the negotiation process, Dupont and Faure (1992)[18] identify four general avenues. Attention has been paid to 1) series of sequences with rules governing sequence of concessions; 2) power processes; 3) persuasive debate; and 4) use of game-theoretic matrices (either improved standard ones i.e. prisoners dilemma, or concepts of critical risk). They discuss global approaches using 1) models such as the three-stage one where the emphasis is on negotiation not being a finite process, and 2) the practitioner theories which balance interpersonal skills and analysis, the latter to aid in uncovering inefficiencies. Dupont and Faure place the origin of practitioner theories and principled negotiation (eg. Fisher19), and management of the tension of value creation and value claiming (eg. Lax & Sebenius 1986[20]) in context. They observe and analyse the process, including types of moves and communication variables. They also discuss referential variables such as face-saving and face-maintenance. They note that the process is influenced by personal traits such as competitiveness and cooperation. In an examination of information (private, public and secret) they suggest that the more negotiators know about each others’ gains and losses, the higher they raise joint gains: this has been experimentally shown. More recently, Zartman[21] points out that until recently the development of negotiation theory has mostly concentrated on two-party processes, in part because of the complexity of the processes involved. In trying to analyse and understand multilateral processes, it has not been possible simply to extrapolate from bilateral processes: a new range of concepts is necessary. Informal meetings are intended to be a value-creation process allowing parties to explore linkages and separate issues, to mutually educate each other and to develop options for later bargaining.

5. A description of four models for informal meetings

5.1 Talloires Dialogue on Trade and Environment

This model provides some specifics about procedure but most strongly serves as beacon to the potential value for parallel informal meetings. The first meeting of the Dialogue[22] sought to bring representatives of two usually adversarial groups together to discuss the general topic of taxes and charges for environmental protection purposes. Participants included GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) officials, ambassadors to GATT/WTO (World Trade Organization), leaders of environmental groups and senior representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations. All participants attended in their personal capacities and the report[23] contains no attribution of statements or comments. In two days of sessions, a wide assortment of topics were discussed. These included an opening overview session and general discussion of environmental taxes. GATT generally focusses on taxes on products rather than processes, while environmentalists feel that in many cases the most effective point at which environmental taxes should be imposed is on the production process itself.The discussion covered three issues: 1) the effect of environmental taxes on competitiveness; 2) discriminatory or protectionist measures disguised as environmental charges; and 3) feasibility of application. Each of these was then discussed in more detail in subsequent sessions. In Session II the specific problem of carbon taxes addressed the general question of competitiveness, US Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards were discussed as a question of disguised protectionism in Session III. Session IV dealt with recycling and clean-up taxes and Session V with transparency.In Session V attention was focussed on environmental NGO participation in the decision-making process of the WTO, in light of the intention by other international organizations to operate more openly. These meetings were very efficient with a focussed discussion covering a large amount of material in a short time.Participants were ‘intellectually homogenous’ in the sense that they mutually recognized each others’ expertise and that they were all well-prepared. However, these two features are much less likely to be found in an informal meeting during prenegotiations for an environmental treaty.Participants would likely be variably well-prepared, possibly coming from culturally different backgrounds with different styles of interaction and communication. Participants at the Talloires dialogue did not, by the nature of that meeting, have to answer in the end to a home constituency or a government. In a few ways it even resembled a problem-solving workshop for conflict resolution.There were two sides with opposing points of view and a free-flowing discussion was encouraged with unobtrusive facilitation.

5.2 The Use of Scientific workshops in treaty negotiations<

Three examples have been mentioned at any length in the literature. In three cases, models were introduced to the discussion that substantially changed the course of the subsequent negotiations.These were the MIT model used in the Law of the Sea discussions, the IMAGE model used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change meeting[24], and the RAINS model used in the acid rain negotiations in Europe. The MIT model was developed in 1976 to explore the technology and costs of a hypothetical ocean mining operation. It was exhaustively reviewed and then brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Law of the Sea conference, Tommy Koh, by the head of the US delegation.The model proved to be a useful and neutral asset to the discussions on the financial component of the negotiations. It assisted the financial experts to improve the provisions in the informal negotiating text of the conference[25], [26]. On presentation at a workshop during the conference, it was well-received and appeared to improve the tone of communications during subsequent meetings on finance[27]. The RAINS model was developed and used during the negotiations on acid rain in Europe between 1983 - 1991 style=’mso-footnote-id:ftn28′ href=”#_ftn28″ name=”_ftnref28″ title=”"> class=MsoFootnoteReference> [28] style=’font-size:12.0pt’>. It was used as a tool to display a full picture of the problem that negotiators were dealing with. It could analyse various scenarios including options for energy use, abatement strategies and mitigation policies. It had the credibility of broad scientific review and input from participants as to the kinds of questions that they wanted to be able to answer.From all descriptions of the introduction of these models, it appears that not only did the model aid participants in grasping very challenging concepts but it also introduced a more problem-focused approach. Clearly, the intention of using these models was to try substantively to develop options in the negotiations. Such a value creating exercise moved the process in a positive direction towards an agreement that provided gains for all parties and a clearer understanding of the problem, both of which helped forge an effective agreement.

5.3 Problem-solving workshops and ethnic conflict

Problem solving workshops have been used with mixed success in ethnic conflict resolution in the Middle East[29] and in other conflict areas such as Cyprus and South-East Asia[30], Africa and Latin America<[31]. The theoretical basis for these is strongly social-psychological and much attention is put on the participants to help them develop self-awareness and self-analysis. A supportive environment is created to facilitate this process. There are stringent ground rules about confidentiality and also confidentiality of participation. The reason for the latter is that participants in some conflicts would be contravening treason laws in their own countries if they engaged in contact with adversaries. Psychological case-work elements are used by consultants in this process. This means that the consultant’s role as a third party is supportive (offering sympathetic understanding), non-directive (initiative solely from the client), non-condemnatory (no value judgment reactions from the consultant), self-determinate (the search for solutions is largely in the hands of the client) and analytical (clarifying the clients perception of his/her actual situation in relation to outer reality)[32]. Participants in these workshops are usually drawn from a circle of officials not directly connected to those responsible for ‘public’ managment of the conflict, but rather who may be close to such high profile figures.The workshop permits a dialogue to occur within the conditions listed above. Each side may speak frankly and openly and be sure to be heard by the other participants. New points of view can emerge and exchanges of ideas are possible. The major difference between this situation and environmental negotiation is that the adversity dimension of ethnic conflict is greatly magnified. Participation in problem-solving workshops has usually only occurred because a “hurting stalemate”[33] has been achieved. A second difference is that such a dialogue is usually only constructed around two and very occasionally three adversaries.Most environmental negotiations have many more participants than this. Essentially useful segments from problem-solving workshops are the definition of the role and attitude of the consultants/facilitators and the structure of the dialogue.Some of these elements can also be seen in the fourth type of model, track two diplomacy, that I propose as having some useful elements. This particular case recounts some of the informal contacts between the US and the Soviet Union beginning in 1960.

5.4 Citizen diplomacy and the Dartmouth Conferences.

Hickman and Garrison[34] ascribe the invention of the term “track two” or citizen diplomacy to Joseph Montville, a career diplomat in the US State Department. Track two refers to constructive, unofficial, informal interactions between individual and groups on different sides of ethnic and sectarian conflicts.As an adjunct to official, traditional, nation-to-nation diplomacy, it seeks to reduce psychological barriers between contending parties. At the urging of President Eisenhower, Norman Cousins, then editor of Saturday Review, arranged a meeting between private American and Soviet citizens[35]. The first meeting occurred in October 1960 at Dartmouth College after 18 months of preliminary negotiations. It lasted one week without any substantive breakthroughs.But the development of personal relationships formed a foundation through which the most complex and emotionally charged issues could later be constructively addressed.Full plenary sessions have met approximately once every two years since 1960. Since 1981 smaller working groups or task forces on regional conflicts have met every 6 - 8 months. Plenary meetings involved 30-40 Soviets and Americans conversing around a single table.More often both sides used the occasion to try to “sell” particular viewpoints in speeches full of propaganda. These meetings were almost always superficial. Valuable meetings occurred when there was a well-defined subject of interest to most participants and this led to substantive contributions.In these, each side exchanged views about perceived trends and policies in the other’s country.This encouraged thoughtful, analytic presentations and discussion on subjects such as arms control and the Middle East situation. Plenary sessions were also useful for task forces to report the results of deliberations.The task forces met both in the interim of and during plenary sessions, and these reports helped provide a continuity to the overall project. Task forces consisted of 4-5 participants on each side. These met regularly with a more stable core of participants and greater frequency of interaction - every 6-8 months - which gave a greater sense of continuity.This led to more thorough preparation, more effective follow-up and a longer term perspective.From this, in turn, grew a more frequent elaboration of ideas and insights useful in the policy arena. Preparation on the US side included elaborating the network of informed people involved in the dialogue, developing new ideas and approaches for discussion, ensuring that participants had a clear idea of official policy, and choosing a strategy for discussions.Some task forces found it useful to conduct informal seminars of 15-20 individuals both before and after task force meetings. The preliminary seminar included some part of the above list and in follow-up meetings insights and ideas were shared and discussed. Occasionally, informal papers were prepared but less so as meetings became more frequent, focussed and substantial. Both sides conferred before and after with senior government officials. The primary purpose of this was to reduce the likelihood of incorrect signals but also to ensure that official views were fairly presented.

There were three formal rules and a number of informal ones:

1. No papers were to be read before the group, even if prepared prior to the meeting;
2. Opening remarks by the co-chairs were limited to five minutes. Individual interjections throughout a session were limited to three minutes; and
3. Each side alternated in making presentations. This avoided verbal “barrages” by successive speakers on one side.

Informally, there was open recognition of a need to air concerns and grievances.For example the first hour or two of meeting in the arms control task force was devoted to “mutual recriminations” - each side got an opportunity to deliver complaints about the other. If recriminations re-emerged in later parts of discussions, these were stopped by reminders that the time for these had passed earlier.On contentious issues, both sides were able to avoid the almost irresistible urge to engage in polemics and accusations. Real differences of viewpoint were not glossed over: “fawning words of concession and pretended agreement do not win respect or confidence”[36]. Bolling[37] also felt that it was important to state differences with dispassion and to listen attentively to even the most outrageous contrary views. He advocated listening rather than talking and also observed that the most crucial part of a discussion was likely to occur after everybody had spoken once. The value of these conferences was shown on a number of occasions. In October 1962, as the meeting was about to begin, the Cuban missile crisis engulfed the world’s attention. After establishing from their respective governments that the conference should continue, the conferees then played a role in a communication channel via the Vatican. Both groups of participants regarded this occasion as highlighting the absolute necessity of a private forum, even though they recognized that their effect on the overall process was probably quite marginal. In 1969-1970 the Dartmouth Conferences brought together a number of Soviet and US enviromental scientists. These discussions helped prepare for the formal agreements on scientific cooperation signed at the May 1972 Summit meeting. During this same period Soviet-US economic relations were examined and this came to be formalised in the US-Soviet trade agreement in October 1972. The overall conduct of the meetings was not based on universal formulas or guidelines for reaching particular goals. Private diplomacy cannot substitute for official diplomacy - private citizens are in any case forbidden by law to conduct negotiations independently. Stewart suggests that “private diplomacy seems best suited to developing conditions for problem solving”.This then set the stage for intergovernmental movement towards resolution. The goal of this private diplomacy was not to influence directly policies of either country. Rather, the desire was to indirectly shape the images of the possible that policy makers of each country brought to solving problems.The Soviets were concerned about excessive openness and didn’t generally stray too far from official positions and therefore repeated ’safe views’. In the Soviet Union at that time, formal institutions shaped the influence of internal policy but personal ties were significant and important. Private activities on both sides ranged from establishing contacts with appropriate private persons, to helping develop a clear image of the interests and perceptions of specific issues and even to creating new concepts on questions of mutual interest. Attempting a clear definition of the problem required extended time for formulation and re-articulation[38]. The major contributions of this private dialogue, according to Harold Saunders[39] were:

1. Identifying human obstacles to better official relationships;
2. Understanding or confirming real interests as defined by each side;
3. Identification of alternative approaches to impasse for both sides; and
4. An opportunity for discussing and testing methods for improving machinery to be used in crises.

The Dartmouth Conferences addressed a particular type of tension in a unique context in international relations and did so successfully. Part of its success seems to have been that it evolved to meet the special needs of the situation. The use of a two-tier system for group size and the set of ground rules seem both to have been significant to effectiveness.

6. What can be distilled from these models?

These conceptual remarks serve as an introduction to a practical description of parallel informal meetings. Parallel informal meetings are a structured extension of informal contact which have been widely used in all types of negotiations and diplomacy. Problem-solving workshops, the Dartmouth Conferences and the Talloires Dialogue illustrate that a structured meeting can engage intelligent exploration by participants to solve the most contentious types of disagreements. The Dartmouth conferences provide a good basic logistical outline for the structure of such meetings, including the number of participants, the order of discussion and the need to encourage contribution from all participants. Problem-solving workshops provide some guidance as to attitude on the part of facilitators of such meetings. Scientific/technical workshops indicate that education and complex problem-orientation can be successfully accomplished within the framework of a negotiation process. However, none of these models provide a good general foundation for informal meetings in the context of a complex multiparty environmental negotiation.Three of these four models dealt with moderate to strongly adversarial bilateral scenarios. Two of the four were in the context of environmental issues but were more narrowly focussed on issues of interpretation (Talloires) and technical/scientific interpretations. Three out of the four were not directly connected to a formal negotiating process, such as a treaty discussion or a conference of parties. I propose a structure below that draws on the most useful attributes of these four models.

7. A proposed structure for parallel informal meetings.

This would be a carefully structured short conference of 25 - 50 participants for the purposeful exploration of controversial issues of substance regarding treaty development, ratification or amendment. It would not last more than three days. The decision to have a parallel informal meeting would rest with the leadership of a new treaty under negotiation or with the secretariat of an existing treaty or agreement as a part of a Conference of Parties. During the process of a formal negotiation, parties concerned with contentious central or corollary issues (these could be defined in the formal process) would be invited to participate in a parallel but structured, confidential ‘conversation’. The intention would be to foster exploration of the agreed upon issue(s) with the help of facilitators. The particular purpose would be to expand issues, discuss alternatives and possibilities, and generate new options for consideration in the formal negotiation process. These would not be transferred as a product of the informal meeting. In fact the entire proceedings would be confidential and any statements would be without attribution. Success in engaging in a meaningful exchange of views in conflict resolution workshops has hinged on total confidentiality, extending in many instances to knowledge of participation in such a workshop. There would preferably be no specific restrictions on participation. The participants would not be limited in number but would be expected to be fully conversant with the topic for exploration. The meetings and the course of the discussion would be confidential, although any agreed-upon statements or report might later be released to the formal proceedings, without attribution as was done, for example, with the report of the Talloires meeting. This type of meeting would be intended to marshall the largest variety of stakeholders, viewpoints and representation possible for the purposes of problem solving. All participants would be required to attend in a personal capacity since this would not be a formal, legally-binding negotiation. All participants would be there by the invitation of the organizers but agreed upon by all parties. Meeting organizers would have distilled a particular controversy down to two or three but no more than five constituent items or questions. The questions or topics would be canvassed both among treaty participants and among other experts by a planning team appointed by the secretariat and narrowed down. Reading material would be selected, prepared and available ahead of time. Respondents would be appointed for the meeting to give a five minute overview of particular positions with respect to a given question. General conversation would follow moderated by two or three experienced mediators/negotiators. Every participant would have, if possible, the opportunity to speak at least once before any one spoke a second time - any individual can cede the chance to speak if they choose.The initial joint session would last approximately 2 1/2 - 3 to three hours (a morning). The following session would be a smaller-group caucus where participants could further discuss specific issues and topics based on the prior joint session.This session could be two hours long (for example, the early part of an afternoon) with one of the mediators present but functioning in a more limited role of time keeper and observer.Again, each participant would have the opportunity to speak once before any one else spoke twice.Each caucus group would have the option of preparing a report to present to the full meeting. This caucus session would be followed by a second joint meeting. Each caucus would have the opportunity to use an inital five minute slot to report to the whole meeting. This session would once again last 2 1/2 - 3 hours and would conclude a day’s meeting.Participants could decide whether or not to come to a joint decision or to decide that a conclusion or particular finality had been reached on a question or topic under discussion.This could include a decision to explore specific and clearly identified details at another meeting. The main intention would be to ensure that a free and frank exchange of views took place.In this way a day of deliberation could be devoted to each of the two or three questions. These meetings should not be confused with and are not intended to replace informal contact. This generally occurs in smaller groups, in corridors and during meals and other social activity during a formal conference and contribute to, and are an accepted part of, multi-party conference and negotiation. A parallel formal meeting would provide both formal and informal occasions to develop personal relationships to explicitly support an integrative negotiation outcome.

8. Some possible applications for informal meetings

A set of ten practical recommendations, known as the Salzburg Initiative, has been developed to overcome the increasing mistrust between nations and to achieve some cooperation in the face of escalating global environmental problems40. Susskind suggests that the major thrust of international environmental treaty bargaining should be around the resolution of the political conflict rather than an exercise in solving a set of scientific and technical problems. Descriptions of some negotiations suggest that these may be more closely linked: for example, of the ten recommendations in the Salzburg Initiative, five would directly benefit from the use of parallel formal meetings. In the first recommendation, building decentralized alliances, clusters of countries with common regional and/or technical interests are encouraged to caucus together ahead of time of a formal treaty negotiation. Parallel informal meetings could provide a format for such regional caucuses.The development of regional coalitions could then be amplified to form larger negotiating units, thus removing the need for this at the formal treaty meeting. Issues of real importance would tend to emerge through this process and these could then be scrutinised in depth during the bargaining process. Parallel informal meetings offer substantial support for the third recommendation, namely adopting new approaches to treaty making. Parties enter the negotiating process with widely different levels of knowledge on the topic, with more positional attitudes about their own interests and with uncertainty about the positions and interests of other parties.Parallel informal meetings offer the possibility of taking clearly thought out positions to a negotiation and of greater flexibility during bargaining. Informal meetings would contribute to the development of regional versions of a treaty by giving the opportunity to consider process as well as substantive issues. Recommendation four seeks to expand the roles for NGO interests. Again, parallel informal meetings are a forum where this could occur.NGO’s have played vital roles in all areas of environmental negotiations and treaty implementation but national sovereignty and international law do not permit them to be parties in signing, ratification or adoption. In attempting to develop a better balance between science and politics, recommendation six suggests that the full range of scientific research be presented without attempts at resolution of the scientific disagreements. Policy makers should not look to scientific groups to provide either policy recommendations or definitive interpretations. Informal meetings would allow groups on opposite sides of a given issue to meet along with members of the scientific community to attempt to disentangle science and policy in a detailed and constructive way. Finally, recommendation seven encourages issue linkage. Creative linkage would provide incentives for countries to view international negotiations quite differently. Developing countries especially would be able to have some of their political and economic concerns more explicitly addressed.Informal meetings would provide a forum where linkage bundles could be created and perhaps bargained on a smaller scale. It might also be possible to develop side agreements in these meetings that would encourage the formation of useful coalitions in a larger formal process.

9.Conclusion

I have attempted to show that parallel informal meetings could provide a means to explore and enlarge the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) in technically and scientifically complex environmental negotiations. The models I selected suggest that this can be done by focussing attention on particularly controversial issues within a negotiation, with the intention of arriving at a solution by engaging creative thinking of a group. With suitable adaptation, parallel informal meetings might help to refine the process of finding creative and powerful alternatives in other types of negotiations, such as security and trade.

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This outline describes the development of a residency program for visual artists, film-makers, writers, and scientists, as well as a facility to house the program. The mission of the center will be to promote collaboration among highly creative people to make art that celebrates and elevates our perception of the natural world and our sense of place in it. The program will select and invite resident fellows to use the facility and its location in coastal southeastern Massachusetts for this specific purpose. Artists and scientists who focus their work on nature and the environment will break new intellectual ground by forging collaborative partnerships. This section summarizes the overall concept, followed by a rationale, a brief description of the program, and an outline of the financial model.

The center will accommodate from ten to fourteen resident fellows for nine months on a rotational basis each year. Fellows will be selected through review of applications by a small revolving-member selection committee comprising past fellows, a representative of the local arts community, and members of the center’s board of directors. Applicants will be asked to outline a specific project or subject focus for their residency period. They will also be encouraged to participate in small teams on projects.

In addition, the center will be open to the public for short courses as a summer school for ten weeks during July - September each year. Drawing on their multi-disciplinary expertise, resident fellows will teach week long seminars as part of their responsibility to the center. Concurrent seminars will include 10 - 15 participants.

The facility will operate year-round to provide a gathering place focused on art for the community and local residents. There will be a year-round visual arts program for children and young people that will be expanded during the summer into camp format. During the summer months the facility will open a café restaurant for the use of Summer school participants and open to the general public. It will contain a 4,000 square foot gallery space for showing work and projects completed by fellows. The space will be available for showing film and for rental to local residents and others for functions and purposes consistent with the mission of the center.

To accommodate the program, I propose to build a new campus style facility of approximately 16,000 square feet, designed to the highest current standards of green or sustainable design - at least a Gold rating from the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) rating system. The mini-campus design will situate separate buildings on a three to four acre site (Attachment 1). If possible, the facility will be connected to an organization that complements the core mission of the program, and preferably built on a site close to an area of natural beauty such as conservation land, a preserve or farm. Almost any coastal location in southeastern Massachusetts ensures close proximity to a wide range of beautiful and inspirational places. I envisage the location and design ethos of the center to embody and reflect the ideals that will be inherent in the creative output of the resident fellows.

Rationale

On this threshold of the 21^st
century we find ourselves on an increasingly destructive trajectory with our natural environment. The visual and print media broadcast enormous cascades of images and information that amplify this tragic fact. Environmental catastrophes such as the Asian tsunami in 2004, hurricanes Katrina and Rita swamping New Orleans, or the massive earthquakes in Pakistan and Northern India make compelling news clips. Global climate disruption and a host of other human assaults on the environment are also gaining more attention. Whether the cause be natural or anthropogenic, images of natural disasters tend to converge with positive environmental images as the primary representation of nature in our collective minds. As a result, most of us either feel powerless, or we retreat into denial and continue with our lives.

I believe there is a deep hunger among all people for imagery and ideas to contradict this media onslaught. In our fast paced and “now” centered culture we tend to minimize or overlook the extent to which artists and art have changed the course of human history. There is a real and urgent need for art that reminds us of our sense of place in nature. All media documenting nature and environment suffer from a shortage of icons and images that engage and uplift people at all levels.

This center will be in the vanguard of organizations taking on this challenge nationally or even internationally. Globally, there are very few organizations that are addressing the nexus between art and science generally (Attachment 2) and only a handful that have any focus on art and environment. At this new center, the synergy between artists’ and scientists’ visions will generate fresh positive ideas in language and media accessible to everyone on a more personal and immediate level.

I believe that a process of reconnection can have profound and far-reaching influence. It will greatly reduce our collective resistance to change and, hopefully, lead us to alter our individual and collective behavior. This in turn will lead to changing our policies and our laws to fundamentally embody regenerative treatment of our environment.

The Program

Ten Month Residents

The residency will be open to all scholars, artists and scientists at any stage in their careers. Year long residents will be encouraged to apply as a team to develop clearly designed multi-disciplinary projects. However, each member of the team will also qualify for individual residency awards. Applicants will also be fully encouraged to apply individually but will be encouraged to seek some collaboration, as appropriate, once at the center. Using a multi-disciplinary approach for team projects will enable the center to seek goal-oriented funding in addition to support for individual projects. Where necessary, and when the center is more established, I will also commit the center’s development resources to assist in fundraising for projects.

Residents will be provided room, board, and a stipend, but not travel costs. They will also be provided with workspace or studio space appropriate to discipline. Each resident will be expected to teach four weeks of summer school at some point in their residence period. They will be encouraged to show work-in-progress or completed work in the gallery space.

Scientists will have different options. They may visit for day-long retreats, short term stays (2 - 3 weeks) or apply for ten month sabbaticals. However, only ten month resident scientists will be eligible for resident benefits described above. Scientists will be encouraged to use the sabbaticals for writing in addition to their participation in center collaborations.

Summer School Participants

Summer school courses will run for ten weeks from July until mid-September and will be open to all members of the public over the age of 16. Attendees will be able to register for any number of one week seminars and short courses during this period. Courses will be taught by ten month residents, scientists and additional faculty as needed. Classes will run for three hours each morning and each afternoon with tutorial times arranged as needed for each course. There will be a concurrent summer arts camp for children in K-12. The restaurant café will offer breakfast and lunch service for participants, visitors and the public during the summer school period.

Financial Model

My estimate for initial building costs for the center will be approximately $300 per square foot for new construction with maximal energy efficiency and environmentally benign construction materials. Thus, a preliminary estimate for construction of a facility of approximately 16,000 square feet is $4.8 million. I am exploring the feasibility of a partnership with an existing organization that has a complementary mission and sufficient site space to permit us to construct the facility on their premises.

To fulfill its mission and deliver its program, this facility will require five to seven full time staff to operate and maintain it. Initial estimates for salary costs are approximately $400,000-$500,000 and additional annual administration and maintenance costs approximately $250,000. Therefore, the overall annual budget for the center will be about $650,000 in the first year, with a projected increase of roughly ten percent per year. Income will be derived from the summer school program, lease of the restaurant café, and from rentals of the gallery space for other functions. Necessary additional funds to cover this budget will be generated through standard development tools (individual giving, memberships, fundraising etc.).

Based on similar programs in other locations in New England, it will cost approximately $20,000 per month to support twelve resident fellows for 10 months with studio space, full board, accommodation and a small stipend (Annual Total $240,000). My goal will be to derive sufficient earned income from the summer school participants to fully support the residency program. In order to reach this minimum total ($240,000), the center will need to reach a three year goal of approximately 500 summer school attendees each paying $500 per week, and some attendees enrolling for more than one week. This would require a minimum average weekly enrollment of 40 summer school attendees for twelve summer weeks.

Please send any comments and ideas to: John Glyphis (email: jglyphis@comcast.net)

Attachment 1

A design concept for the Residency Center

Charles Rose: The Atlantic Center for the Arts, New Smyrna Beach, FL

Attachment 2

An Overview of some Art/Science Collaborative Organizations

Budget Rationale

Each item listed below corresponds to a line item listed in the five year projected budget (provided separately) for the center.

1. My five-year goal is that the income from the twelve weeks of summer school together with the childrens camp will contribute to at least 50% of total income. This proportion will ensure that the costs for the ten month residency program would be completely covered. My goal in the first year is for 100 participants to register for a one week course. With a 25 - 30 % increase in enrollment each subsequent year, it will be possible to reach a maximum of 800 participants in Year 5.
2. The children’s program will provide an additional convenient option for parents who might be enrolled in a summer school course. It will be geared for children K-10 but with an expectation that it will be focused more on younger children since young adults (16 years and older) will be eligible to enroll in the summer school program. It will be necessary to hire a part-time program coordinator for three months to oversee this camp. Ideally, this position will be filled as an internship by a local resident working on an arts/education graduate degree. The first year enrollment goal will be 60 for the summer. The number of participants will be kept at an enrollment ceiling of 100 for the summer, with a maximum of 15 (one manageable class) for any given week. A couple of spaces will be reserved as scholarships for children from the local community.
3. Indications suggest that the combination of science and art will make this center particularly attractive to a wider range of philanthropic institutions. I will seek foundation support from local and national philanthropic sources, in particular those that are interested in supporting nonprofits with multidisciplinary missions. Also, with approximately 50% of the budget derived from earned income, there is an opportunity for seeking matching funding.
4. I expect to increase individual giving by using the expansion of center membership as a resource. Although the increase in this budget item is higher in the earlier years, we will aim to have it keep pace with the expansion in both center membership and the annual summer school enrollment. Membership will also be augmented with a marketing strategy during the summer months and using center events as a venue.
5. Each summer school participant will be invited to become a center member. This membership due will cover the cost of a quarterly newsletter, advance invitations to center events, and other benefits yet to be determined. The increased enrollment each year is predicated on the increasing number of summer school participants.
6. Other residency facilities have found rental of center space for outside functions to be a financially worthwhile and relatively low impact revenue source. It provides a chance for the larger community to enjoy the beauty of the architecture and location, to get a sense of the type of activity engaging the residents, and, importantly, to provide an expanded public relations and institutional advancement opportunity. The three types of rentals that would be of likely interest include weddings, galas and dinners, and cheese/wine receptions. Our aim is for a total of 17 events in each of the first two years, or approximately one per weekend for the 16 weeks June to late September. This number expands to 25 in Year 4. Once the center is well-established we will also explore using a tiered rate system to enable community groups and other nonprofits to use the facility at lower cost.
7. I have scheduled just two weddings in each of the first two years and then increased this number to five, a conservative estimate for the likely interest in the venue. The rental amount of $3000 for 6 hours (with some flexibility) does not include the use of chairs and tables. Renting these in addition can realize an additional income of $15 - 20 per person or an additional $1500 - $2000 for a hundred person event. There might also be a catering business opportunity for weddings using the gallery space and the kitchen facilities of the center. A lower bound estimate for total wedding costs (venue, furniture, decoration, food and beverage) are currently estimated at approximately $200 per person.
8. Hosting galas and dinners offers the same income opportunities as weddings, also with the potential for using the center kitchen for catering the event. Our initial aim will be for the center to host five such events in each of the first two years and double this number thereafter.
9. I have estimated that the center will be able to host ten outside cheese/wine events each year. In addition, all of these will promote and/or market the center more widely.
10. The estimate of $45 per square foot is based on due diligence for the region that suggests a range of $30 - $60 for this type of space. The area of 2000 square feet includes an appropriate sized kitchen of about 500 square feet or more as required by code. According to state planning codes, each seated patron requires 15 square feet, and therefore a facility of this size will be able to accommodate at least 100 seated guests at one time. Additional storage space, and preparation and cleanup areas will be determined and included during the design phase for the facility. The lease of additional restaurant space will provide income from the center facility while also ensuring that summer school participants can easily purchase meals, especially breakfast and lunch during the week. It may be possible to form a partnership with a regionally based cooking school (e.g. Johnson and Wales, Culinary Institute of America) about the possibility of using the facility as a summer training venue. The lease will include the ability to serve dinner during the summer, as well as the option to host and cater weddings separately from those hosted and/or catered by the center in its gallery space. This potential additional income should make the lease more attractive to a potential lessee, given that the use of the location will be strongly seasonal and there will be a need to augment earnings using other opportunities. The Office/Facility Manager will coordinate schedules to ensure that the center and the restaurant do not host concurrent events.
11. The Executive Director will have the usual range of responsibilities (interface and interaction with the Board of Directors, oversee the center staff, work with the Advancement Director etc). During the first year, s/he will take cover the duties of Residency/Events coordinator. These will include establishing the first six resident fellows; developing and promoting the first summer school program; working with the Office Manager to program the events outlined in 5) - 9) above; establishing the operation of the leased restaurant space; and other contingent duties. S/he will have the option of living on site in a small efficiency apartment, living locally or commuting. The use of an efficiency apartment in the center will entail some adjustment in income.
12. Director of Advancement will be responsible for all fundraising, marketing, and promotion strategy activity for the center, in coordination with the Executive Director. Fundraising will include cultivating foundation opportunities as well as corporate and individual giving. Marketing will focus on both the ten-month resident program and the summer school. S/he will also have the use of an efficiency apartment in the center and this will entail some adjustment in income.
13. In addition to the usual responsibilities, the Office/Facility Manager will coordinate all physical use of the facility. This includes coordinating (with the Residency/Events coordinator) the scheduling of events, arrangements and contracts with all outside contractors, including both single events contracts and regular services (e.g. cleaning and grounds).
14. The Residency/Events Coordinator will oversee all aspects of the programmatic use of the center, working closely with the Executive Director and the Office/Facility Manager. This position will be filled starting in the second year, and take over the responsibilities from the Executive Director. S/he will supervise the annual selection process of twelve residents for the ten month residency. This will include creating and coordinating the work of the selection committee, ensuring that application materials are organized and available (using an electronic internet format if possible), and organizing the arrival, orientation, and logistics of new residents. S/he will also be responsible for the programmatic organization and scheduling of the summer school.
15. The Chef will be responsible for preparing and providing three very high quality, organic as far as possible, meals per day for approximately 20 - 25 people (12 residents, 6 staff and any guests or visitors) year round, with the help of an Assistant. S/he will also be responsible, if required, for catering for some of the events outlined above (6 - 9), or for contributing time to ensure that these are successful. It may be possible to include this position as a component of the partnership with the Culinary Institute of America, or Johnson and Wales, using a recent cooking school graduate seeking professional experience. The Chef will also have use of an efficiency apartment in the center and this will entail some negotiated adjustment in income.
16. The Kitchen Assistant will assist the Chef in all aspects of preparing and providing food to the center on a daily basis. This FTE will have a schedule under supervision of the Chef to ensure that food is available every day including weekends for the Residents. S/he will supervise any part-time preparation and cleaning personnel or perform these duties as needed.
17. The intellectual focus of the center will be the Resident Fellows. In the first two years, just six will be in residence. In the first year they will be selected and invited on recommendation of the Board of Directors without a formal selection process. In the second year, two or three of the inaugural residents will be invited to join the selection committee in order to choose the next six residents. In the third and following years, at least two residents will be invited to serve on the selection committee for each subsequent year. In the third year and thereafter the number of residents will be increased to ten or twelve.
18. This stipend is only intended to cover basic expenses and resident fellows will be encouraged to apply for additional support from outside sources. Commencing in the fourth year, the Advancement Director will be able to provide some assistance and coordination of effort to locate additional sources for individual resident fellows and to support projects.
19. This cost is intended to ensure that the center provide high quality gourmet food, that is, as much as possible, organic, purchased locally (depending on season), and generally opting for healthy choices. A number of residency programs have achieved a very positive reputation because of the notably high quality of the food.
20. This line item will cover the travel (12 airfares @ $750) and two nights of accommodation costs (24 nights @ $300) for five or six committee members to meet for two face to face meetings each year. Stipends for each selection committee member ($550 per day for 24 meeting days) will cost a total of $13,200.
21. The summer school program will require supplies, brochures and catalogs, materials, and possibly some extra staffing.
22. Covers general administration costs for the center, including professional costs (accounting, legal), communications (telephones, fax and internet connections), printing of publications and mailing costs, office supplies and materials.
23. Covers the costs of paying subcontractors for maintenance and repairs (roof, plumbing etc), to ensure that the buildings and surrounding grounds are cleaned and maintained inside and outside. It will also cover the costs of some utilities. Photovoltaic panels on the roof will greatly reduce the need for grid power and may eventually enable the center to be a net producer of power during some parts of the year (e.g. fall and spring).

As we look back over the past decade at the great deal of work that has supported the development and incorporation of the principles of sustainability into many of the institutions of civil society, including colleges and universities, several issues stand out.

First, there has been significant progress in accepting the usefulness of a loose definition of the term. This enables all stakeholders to create and use appropriate working definitions that fit a range of situations.

Second, we have done a great job of learning about the implications of sustainability at the individual level. We have involved ourselves in local government initiatives to reduce the damaging aspects of “footprint” in our neighborhoods, towns and cities. Many are thoughtful about reducing their personal environmental footprints and those of their families and households. Many individuals have taken successful leadership roles in the workplace, including at colleges and universities, around these issues and have been partially successful in institutionalizing concepts. Second Nature’s website contains over 250 stories or profiles that attest to the many college and university projects that have been completed to try to effect large and small scale change. And there are many other success stories from business enterprise and the corporate world.

Third, there are large scale projects attempting to make serious and accurate measurements of progress towards sustainability. There has been an explosive growth in ‘Sustainable City’ initiatives across the country – there are now over 200 of these projects currently in existence [1] – and all began with Alan AtKisson and Lee Hatcher in Seattle in 1990/91. Other significant indicator projects include, among many others, the work of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Global Reporting Initiative.

In this past decade we have seen a significant shift in public discourse towards the issues of sustainability, and even some of the more conservative major research universities are exploring how to respond and move forward. For example global climate disruption[2], human and animal disease epidemics, natural resource damage and depletion, and sprawl, among other issues, receive regular front-page coverage while simultaneously comprise an important part of the university research agenda.

However, we have not made much progress in institutional learning about sustainability, and not just in higher education institutions. A small number of corporations and businesses have made significant strategic shifts towards accounting for a “triple bottom line” and others are seriously exploring how to do this – but these are still a minute fraction of the whole sector. In this paper I suggest that there are some inherent issues in the organizational structure of colleges and universities that make it problematic for these institutions to undertake large scale changes in a short time period on their own. I will expand on four concepts that we at Second Nature have found promising in promoting organizational learning around innovations. The first concept involves recognition of the dynamically integrated campus around sustainability issues; the second is the need for the formation and support of communities of practice; the third is the need to explore the process of innovation diffusion and to make it a component of the discourse within and between the communities of practice; and the fourth is the adoption of innovation through best practice analyses and benchmarking.

In this paper, I have tried to capture something of the essence of these great institutions and I have tried to connect this to our aspiration for their potential future leadership role in society. The ideas outlined below are distilled from six years of institutional experience, gleaned from convening over 40 workshops with more than 1500 participants. Participants came from all segments of the 250 colleges and universities that were represented at these meetings. We have also drawn on the rich source of information provided by our stakeholders and audience that has accumulated on our website, to refine the workshops over time to reflect our own organizational learning on this issue.

Institutional change in higher education

As many of us know first-hand, slowness to change might almost be a defining feature of the modern college or university. Nonetheless, over the past 30 years higher education institutions helped create and have adopted, albeit slowly, a range of useful corporate management tools to their benefit. Some management techniques were tried and discarded without a trace (eg. Management by Objectives - MBO), others leave small traces (eg. Total Quality Management - TQM, Continuous Quality Improvement - CQI), and a few actually alter the landscape but not in ways that were expected (eg. Strategic Planning and Environmental Scanning). The latest wave includes Responsibility-Centered Management (RCM), Benchmarking and Pay-for-Performance. The influence of these last three is not yet known.

Many colleges and universities are attempting to honor their social contract to society, albeit within fairly narrow frames of reference. Often this is the result of student pressure - an example of this is the accelerated interest in service-learning. As a result the academy has become more aware and responsive to its major clients - the students - better at accounting for money, and more sophisticated at marketing [3]. Some of these changes are related to the long term stability – sustainability – of the organization but very narrowly focused on financial sustainability. If these are our greatest and most enduring institutions, how have they managed to survive?

The problem of the boundary-less organization

Colleges and universities are among the oldest institutions in existence - about one millennium. In contrast, there are a handfull of corporations that have existed for two- to three-hundred years, and most other institutions have lifespans measured in years or at most decades. From the stakeholders point of view the stereotypic college or university consists of three types of organizations contained within one system: institution (academy), enterprise and agency[4]. Balderston describes this larger institution as ‘boundaryless’, given that the stakeholder profile can be general enough to include a large number of other civic and corporate institutions. Broadly speaking, the faculty and students generally view it as an institution, the trustees and some administrators consider it to be an enterprise, and governmental and, increasingly, corporate sponsors regard it as an agency. A deeper examination of the responsiveness to change in each of these components provides a hint of why colleges and universities have a powerful reputation for being slow to change. It shows that contradictory views exist among stakeholders of the capability of these organizations to embrace innovations of any type or even, with certain issues, to make decisions that are endorsed across the organization (Table 1).

Table 1. The responsiveness to innovation in three stakeholder components of higher education institutions.

Where did these entities originate? In the next section I have presented some historical detail for three reasons: 1) assistance with locating leverage points for change within the matrix of the organization; 2) the history provides clues about processes and mechanisms that would support or encourage transformation; and 3) to provide a larger context in which to consider future leadership by colleges and universities.

A brief history of the university in the US.

The academy is the oldest of the three components of the boundaryless organization described by Balderston. It also forms the basis of the original universities. In Europe the first universities were founded in the early 1300’s in Edinburgh, Bologna and Paris, although the idea of the Academy can be attributed to Plato[5]. Over the next two centuries (1300 – 1500) universities were established in other parts of Europe including Cambridge and Oxford. In the 1600’s Harvard (1636), Yale and Columbia were established modeled on the older European Institutions. Harvard, founded by Puritans and modeled after Oxford, had a distinctly religious intention in its mission. This pattern was repeated as the colonists spread westward in almost every major settlement. By the time the colonies joined to form a union (1776), there were nine colleges. Less than 100 years later at the time of the Civil War there were 250 colleges. The curriculum in these early schools centered on the study of Latin, Greek and religious philosophy (usually Christianity) with the later addition of other literature, some humanities and only much later the social and basics sciences. Humanities and languages formed the core of the liberal arts tradition for a bachelors degree.

In the period 1800 – 1900 research universities appeared and began to spread in Europe and the United States. In the first half of the 19^th Century in Europe, there was an established tradition at the Royal Institution in England. The French Institutions of Higher Education and the German Research Universities were founded, together with other Science Centers in other parts of Europe. Germany became a clear international leader in chemistry, physics and agricultural sciences[6]. This excellent track record suggested that this was the best model to use in the US and it was duly adopted.

The origins of the American research university (1800 – 1900)

By the early nineteenth century in the US, there was an emerging sense that universities should be teaching more applied arts and mechanics. During this time there were many more proposals for funding to teach such things and to create departments to enable this. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) established in 1824, and even West Point, established in 1808, while largely military, had a strong emphasis on engineering of different kinds. Yale’s Science School was established, (WHEN?)but it was still a neglected aspect of the whole Yale institution. These applied sciences institutions were emerging, but at this early date were not very well established. In 1852, The University of Virginia became the nation’s first university, and eleven years later other states followed suite with the help of an act of congress.

In the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century the shift from a religious-agricultural society to a largely secular-scientific and urban society was fundamentally transforming institutions of higher education. The role of science and technology in society had dramatically increased, a middle class had emerged, greater numbers of people saw education as the ticket to upward socioeconomic mobility, and new professions, largely secular, were emerging. The university had to start producing its own producers of “usable knowledge” as it geared itself to the upwardly mobile and productive society[7].

Establishing the Research Universities

The Morrill or Land Grant Act of 1863 authorized the Federal Government to grant public lands to the States for the sole purpose of endowing state universities in an effort to assist the agricultural economy. This also ensured that a German-style research university was established in every state. The founding of Johns Hopkins marked the adoption of this new idea that included the allowing students to choose elective tracks, most notably concentrations in sciences. In 1871, Harvard President Charles Eliot added elective courses to the core college curriculum, hired faculty with particular specialties and transformed Harvard College into Harvard University[8].

By the mid 1890s, apart from the military-founded Rensselaer and West Point, there were 15 research universities, 10 of which were private (Harvard, Columbia, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Yale, MIT, Cornell, Johns Hopkins and Stanford, and University of Chicago). The five state schools in existence at this time were Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin and California, and Virginia, which had not yet transformed into a research institution. All 15 institutions offered Bachelors degrees in humanities, arts, social and basic sciences and graduate degrees in the major professions. By the beginning of the 20th century the research university as we know it was fully established. Its graduate schools were modeled after the successful German research university model and the undergraduate education had a foundation in the liberal arts tradition.

The creation of the modern university coincided with the increasing role of science and technology in society, that, in turn began to displace earlier forms of higher education that were controlled by the religious authorities. The institutions came to embody the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals that fundamental truths are knowable by reason alone, and that all persons must be given an opportunity to develop and display their rational powers. This marked the beginning of the democratization of education, which was until then a largely elite enterprise[9].

During this period there was an emerging emphasis on applied studies. In concert with this trend came the notion that state institutions should provide direct public services. This concept of the practical applicability of education was not confined to technology; social scientists, for example, began to take on prominent roles advising governments.

Coming from different backgrounds and established for different reasons, different Universities embodied different ideals, yet they all very soon took on the same internal organization and practices. Specialization, expertise and proficiency came to define all aspects of the academy, including the humanities. Professional associations marked off turf and monopolized particular concepts and methods, making communications across the disciplines increasingly problematic.

“Before 1890, there had been room for
academic programs that differed markedly from one another. During the 1890’s, in a very real sense the American academic establishment lost its freedom. To succeed in building a major university, one now has to conform to the standard structural pattern in all basic respects…a competitive market for money, students, faculty, and the prestige dictated the avoidance of pronounced eccentricities.” [10] (p. 339-340)

From the Progressive Era on, there was growing support for the newly cast modern Universities, both from private philanthropy and from public funding. This was going beyond the piecemeal funding of earlier times. For example the 1890 Mill Tax gave Universities a fixed percentage of all mill tax that was collected. It became necessary to separate administration from teaching in order to accommodate the growth of these institutions.

The Industrial Revolution in America was marked by scientific enterprise taking on more of a prominent role. In addition the economic and demographic shift move from farm to factory, and the resulting industrial division of labor lead to occupational specialization. A middle class began to define itself with tracks of achievement, occupations, professions, and careers. “Members of this emerging class began to see their futures in terms of the tasks they would perform in the industrial economy rather than their reputations in their local towns.” (Edgerton[11], pg. 2) As the social economy began to shift, there was a growing sense of discontent with the traditional models of higher education. Increasingly, people were not receiving the kind of education that they needed for the practicalities of their lives and
.

Innovation and the American University in the 20th Century

The establishment of the modern research university ensured that higher education
became a center of innovation for the next 80 - 100 years. Crow[12] suggests that the evolution of US science and technology policy has been marked by three phases: a Laissez-Faire period (1790 - 1940), followed by the War and Post-war period (1940 -1950), and the Federalization Period (1950 -1975).

From 1790 - 1940 the government had no distinct science and technology policy or mission. The government did establish some key R & D labs to support weak industries (for example, mining ) but the key institutions in the national innovation system were the independent corporate R&D labs (for example, Du Pont). The newly established research universities served as the home of basic and advanced science training, with some support for research activity. Policy and research in this era was responsible for a long list on new innovations with wide positive impact on everyday life – including machine tools, sewing machines, hardware, agricultural implements, bicycles, electrification, and telegraphy and telephones
title=”">[13].

During the war and post-war period (1940 - 1950), to support the war effort, the federal government established hundreds of new R&D institutions and an expanded role for academic science. By the mid-50’s the whole country seemed to be benefiting from this expanded role of universities; productivity was up, the tax base had increased. Then in the 1960’s the launching of Sputnik and the resulting damage to US techno-scientific pride, the emergence of the Civil Rights movement, and the baby boomers reaching college age all occurred at a time of unprecedented prosperity in the US. The resulting expansion of research, training, buildings and faculty took place with great enthusiasm and little attention to the quality of content.[14] At this same time, another wave of standardization swept over higher education with the professionalization of research. The ideals of the German Research Institution were coming to dominate the university.

It is also no coincidence that in the early 1900s the first large philanthropic foundations were established. In 1910 there were eighteen, of which the most influential were the Carnegie and Rockefeller. Both notably focused on the advancement of basic knowledge–chemistry and physics in particular. In the 1950s and 1960s foundations were ahead of all other private sources of support for higher education. Today foundations support comprises about 20 percent of all private support, or almost $4.0 billion, ranking third behind alumni and ‘friends’ who contribute a combined 54 percent, or about ten billion dollars[15].

Universities became dependent on the financial prosperity of the 1940-1970’s, so the economic crisis of the 70’s inevitably led to another surge in industry relations. By 1980 The Bayh-Dole Act was passed, giving universities the legal right to patent and license the results of federally funded research. This inspired an increased interest in technology across institutions of higher education. Interestingly, much of the work in this area has been in fields that were actually part of a move away from military related endeavors and toward ‘social issues’ as an answer to much of the student backlash in the late 60’s and early 70’s. Fields such as biology and chemistry took on a new charge as the medical sciences became a beneficiary of that shift. This trend has continued and expanded as the end of the millennium approached. In 1999 we see research university research supporting the growth of microelectronics, biotechnology, new materials, robotics, aircraft manufacturing, and advanced computer design[16].

In this brief history, I have tried to show that, although the institution of the university or college is old, there have been many wide-ranging changes and innovations within the system, and as such, within each individual institution. What are the implications of this for the adoption and incorporation of the concepts of sustainability?

• Higher education in the US has a well-developed capacity to change or adapt, in spite of the appearance of being slow and deliberate. This capacity has been refined over two centuries in this country and much longer in Europe and elsewhere.
• The amalgam in a single institution of the older liberal arts college tradition and the German research university is inherently a relationship with conflict because the former supplanted the status, functions and traditions of the latter. This tension also exists between the larger research institutions and the four-year liberal arts colleges across the US.
• The spur to develop innovative science and technology was predicated on the needs of a war economy - a shaky premise to use in considering any long-term consequences of new science and technology. It is probably no accident that we have had “wars” on cancer, drugs, and most recently “hunger” – the latter to rationalize a large program on basic and applied research in genetics and biotechnology.
• We should exercise caution in attempting to make generalizations about the capacity or even the interest that these institutions have in considering the implications of sustainability or incorporating such innovation. The success of the German science model in institutional and policy has made it possible for the US to become a global leader in science and technology and any sustainability innovation will have to take this into account.

Sustainability and the University in the 21st Century

Colleges and universities continue to enjoy a high degree of public support in the US. The public compact of support is vibrant and the sector is thriving. The more than four thousand Colleges and Universities have annual expenditures of $200 billion, equivalent to about 4% of gross domestic product. Tony Cortese, David Orr and others have made an eloquent case for these institutions to take the lead in trying to achieve a complete transformation in the way we think about our connection to each other and all the natural systems in our biosphere upon which we are completely dependent. We at Second Nature have identified four particular concepts that might assist with accomplishing this vast transformation:

• Recognizing and developing the campus as a dynamically integrated community;
• Creating and fostering the development of communities of practice centered on the integration of the concepts of sustainability into the institutional management of the integrated community;
• Explore the process of innovation diffusion and to make it a component of the discourse within and between the communities of practice
• Using theory of the diffusion of innovation to uncover and support the sharing of best practices among and between the communities of practice, as appropriate.

1. The campus as a dynamically integrated community

   Based on our experience helping colleges and universities adopt sustainability innovation, we characterize the campus as “an integrated Community”. With this systems view we focus on the existence of five major and interconnected components: faculty (teaching and research); operations and physical plant; students, community outreach; and administration. This view also
   fully acknowledges the existence of a complex list of stakeholders, with students as the primary clients. This forms a cornerstone of Second Nature’s philosophy on institutional change. It offers an exciting range of possibilities for a variety of change agents to work together to transform an institution. Tony Cortese has written extensive and detailed material on this topic[17]. I refer the reader to our website[18] for more depth on this idea. This concept not only requires changes in the sub-components or nodes of the institution but also the need for significant interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary scholarly and day-to-day management
   activity.

2. Communities of Practice

   The term wasfirst coined by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger as a component of analyzing andunderstanding learning[19]. Lave and Wenger developed a complex of ideas around communities of practice in order to explain how humans learn from each other in a wider range of situations, of which the standard classroom is generally considered a narrow and special case. By drawing on observations of practice in some existing apprenticeship guilds among midwives, tailors, naval quartermasters, meat cutters and nondrinking alcoholics they were able to show some general principles operated that increased participation and knowledgeability within a group. The ideas contained in communities of practice serve as a supporting concept for Second Nature’s emphasis on development of a team approach to institutional transformation at all levels within any individual institution. For this reason teams participation is strongly encouraged at Second Nature workshops. In further support of the concept, Second Nature is currently developing resource guides that are tailored to apply to different campus stakeholders (currently for Faculty, Students, Administrators, but planning to expand this list in the future ). This facility will enable each to locate job-function relevant information more easily.

3. Adopting Innovation[20]

   In this section I have made a distinction between adoption of innovation in colleges and universities, and the dynamics of innovation diffusion that would apply to any organization including institutions of higher education.

   Regarding management innovation, colleges and universities have an ambiguous response to new ideas. On the one hand, its members, especially those involved in senior management are supportive, especially if these ideas come from powerful and prosperous boardrooms. For others, especially those involved in teaching and research, this reaction can be mixed with some envy or even anger at the financial rewards that are, or might be, entrained in following the new credo.

   On the other hand, based on an intensive analytical training, academics have an inherent skepticism of things originating in the world of commerce. This is not helped by any accompanying hype, the use of jargon, and a negative reaction to overly glib solutions to complex problems. In addition, in some instances a possibility exists that a rival at another college or university developed these ideas and now stands to reap significant finanacial rewards[21].

   >New “fads” in management have a particular life-cycle[22]. They are introduced with much fanfare about their effectiveness and success. This is followed by further reports of wider adoption and continued elaboration with very little actual data about success or failure. In this initial phase the innovation successfully grabs attention because discussions about it outpace actual experience. As more experience begins to accumulate, a “counter-narrative” begins, the rate of new adopters and proponents declines and the whole discussion loses visibility. In the final phase, the original proponents provide reasons and analysis for the failure of the innovation - often couched in terms of “why it was never really tried”. This can lead to a new round of claims about the innovation with language that tries to distinguish it from the previous fad. The response-to-innovation cycle described above is not unique to higher education – it has been documented in government agencies, health-care providers and other non-profits – and is also not confined to management. It has occurred within academia around such issues as student-centered pedagogical reform, the proper application of technology to instruction, and learning assessment. The fad response cycle, and the response to innovation within academia suggest that higher education is not very different from other organizations.

   Over the past 30 years higher education institutions have adopted a range of corporate management mechanisms to their benefit. As a result they have become more aware and responsive, better at accounting for money, and more sophisticated at marketing. For better or worse, they are more “businesslike’. Some imported techniques have also been successful and have become incorporated without much fanfare. An example of this is “program review” - initially tried and tested in federal agencies and now used in about two-thirds of all colleges and universities. It has been thoroughly adopted but its categories and guidelines reveal its true (distant) origins. Ewell suggests that fads remain fads because they don’t make the necessary cultural translation and/or because there is no particular problem for them to solve. Appropriate ideas will be readily and seemlessly employed if needed, with little opposition.

   Avoidance of extreme positions is very important. Over-zealous proponents using rhetoric that suggests an all-or-nothing approach can presents two significant challenges. It suggests that the organization will enter new territory where anything might happen (high risk) and that what has been done in the past was relatively useless (negative criticism). This engenders, quite understandably, a powerful rhetoric of opposition. Opponents will pose worst case scenarios, which are very difficult to refute by the proponents who have minimal information and little experience.

   Innovation diffusion theory offers some well-grounded theoretical ideas and very practical insights about harnessing and supporting the adoption of sustainability concepts[23]. Second Nature has successfully incorporated this into workshop content with very positive feedback from participants. Recognizing that each person plays a specific role in the process of innovation diffusion–from innovators and change agents, to mainstreamers and curmudgeons–provides us with a mechanism to develop a strategy for change. For an innovation to take hold, it must satisfy the “Gilman equation”: the perceived value of the new way minus the perceived value of the old way must be greater than the perceived cost of making the switch. There are five factors which influence how quickly and thoroughly an idea is adopted: the idea’s relative advantage, complexity, trialability, observability and compatibility.

   Implicit and often unstated is the need for management of conflict. Diffusion of an innovation brings attention to the contradictions and discontinuities between an existing entity and an innovation. For this reason, Alan AtKisson[24] emphasizes the need to understand diffusion dynamics from the theory of innovation diffusion[25] and communication.

4. Best Practices and the incorporation of sustainability concepts

   With increasing pressure from stakeholders, many colleges and universities are beginning to incorporate sustainability concepts into curriculum, campus operations, research and work with communities. Every individual campus is unique, but the processes at work on each one — along with the struggles and successes of administrators, faculty, staff and students — provide valuable lessons for those just beginning and for others already well on the way. Such lessons and case-studies highlight untapped resources and spark ideas for all involved in this ground-breaking work. This process is supported by the implicit connections within each community of practice. As mentioned above, Second Nature’s website contains over 250 stories of sustainability innovation at colleges and universities and there are many others that have been documented elsewhere.

Why use Best Practices benchmarking?

Benchmarking and best practice (henceforth ‘best practice’), while unfamiliar to higher education management as a term, has nevertheless been widely used as a process by colleges and universities, most extensively by the American Productivity and Quality Center (APQC), based in Houston, Texas[26]. Comparison with peer institutions has driven enrollments, funding, recognition, and prestige. Further more, faculty are comfortable with a culture of information sharing through a range of venues, meetings, publications, and more recently the internet.

Best practices appeared in corporations in the early 1990s in companies such as Xerox, Eastman Kodak, and DuPont. These companies claim to have achieved a range of measurable benefits including reduced cycle time, improved customer service, lower costs and improved overall product quality. They have fully integrated benchmarking into strategy, structure and culture and it is usually one of several tools being used.

Benchmarking is more than simply comparing oneself to a statistical standard. Working and learning systematically, first, it is necessary to understand internal work procedures, then to search externally for “best practices” in other organizations. These then have to be adapted to make them workable internally.

In cooperation with a number of other organizations and institutions, APQC has refined a methodology that is simple in concept and complex in execution. They emphasize that the more important information lies in the processes behind the benchmarks, and that adaptation and use of these actually lead to improved performance.

The type of benchmarking (or knowledge-sharing) that is going on in higher education is different from the process in corporations. In higher education comparisons are made among “peers institutions” more in a style of friendly rivalry. True benchmarking encourages comparisons and exchanges outside of the circle of peers to look at quite different types of organizations. Examples are Southwest Airlines mechanics talking to the pit crew of an Indy 500 race car team, the staff of a hospital emergency room talking to Domino’s Pizza about taking relevant customer information quickly over the telephone. Outside pressures and new paradigms are going to strongly encourage colleges and universities to move away from talking solely to “insiders”.

As we have listened to our audience from our workshops, partnerships, business and industry, healthcare and government and on our website, we have heard consistently repeated requests for information and resources and have integrated these into our concept of best practices. These requests include:

• a strong desire for new knowledge and
  updated approaches to improved sustainability
  practices;
• where and how are innovative strategies
  being used; and,
• how to form partnerships and collaboration to exchange information.

Best practices offered a concept that we can use to introduce sustainability content combined with process into the mainstream of any college or university. Based on Second Nature’s experience with its stakeholders we can already highlight some significant lessons from the incorporation of best practice into our regional workshop concept:

• an emphasis on best practice encourages out-of-the box thinking that leads to
  rapid learning;
• best practices provides a model for action and a roadmap for others to use;
• using the concept of best practice will
  help distinguish between real innovation and simple reputation or
  “green-washing”; and
• networking at the workshop created opportunities for collaboration between individuals and institutions, as well as, in unexpected ways, within institutions.

As sustainability innovation is incorporated into the rapidly changing world of higher education, there will be shifts over time about what constitutes a best practice. We fully expect that our framework will need to be expanded and refined to keep pace with this evolution. The content and the focus of the workshops will also shift as our collective understanding changes.

Two Best Practice Stories:

The New Jersey Higher Education Partnership for Sustainability (NJHEPS), and Emory University.

I have chosen to highlight these two examples for the following reasons:

• both provide examples of the development of communities of practice;
• the leaders chose to engage a group of colleagues as co-leaders/facilitators
• both organizations had an overall plan from the beginning developed by the leadership group, which they revised as needed. They explicitly avoided starting a number of haphazard projects that were loosely connected by funding or current institutional reporting relationships.
• both expanded rapidly and intentionally and sought and gained support from the right entities at the right time.

Details on each will be provided in my presentation.

Conclusion

“Universities are our greatest and most enduring social insititutions.” [27] (p.1) They may also be a prototype of the postindustrial organization, most similar to the e-commerce organizations that have sprouted up in the past few years. This is because they live on and for creation, dissemination, and application of knowledge. The university or college…. “at its best offers an interesting and sensitive balance between individuality and collective interdependence; between felt commitment and formal authority; between creativity and production; and even between the frivolous and the serious, the sacred and profane. Other organizations if they are to advance the human condition, may in the future have to become more like universities than the other way around” [28] (p. 5).

But universities have to take much greater responsibility for the state of our planet. The earth’s biosphere is in an increasing state of disequilibrium that is threatening the viability of natural systems. This disequilibrium is either directly or indirectly a function of human agency, and largely a function of a deeply flawed relationship between humans and their natural habitat. We continue to educate generation after generation of students as if there were no environmental crisis. Environmental ignorance is increasing as the population expands, and gaining environmental understanding must be an essential goal of every student’s education.[29] Therefore, using the goal of sustainability as the organizing principle of education is a crucial step in addressing ecological imbalance and repairing the human relationship with the natural world and the relationship that humans have with each other.

1. [1] Alan AtKisson, personal communication.
2. [2] The use of
   the word is considered important to distinguish it from the process of climate
   change which, according to climate experts looking at the paleo-climate
   evidence, indicates is a natural occurrence.
3. [3] Ewell,
   P. 1999. Imitation as Art - Borrowed Management Techniques in
   Higher Education. Change. Vol 31
   (6).
4. [4] Balderston, F. 1995. Managing Today’s University. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
5. [5] It seems that Plato’s Academy holds this honor in the western tradition. By establishing the academy, Plato ensured that a venue would exist that would publicly support the right of certain citizens to engage in scholarly debate over the most contentious ideas without fear of retribution - the birth of Academic Freedom (his beloved mentor and teacher Socrates had been executed for ruining the minds of the (male) youth of Athens). Plato also wrote down the ideas and philosophy of Socrates, who is thought to have been unable to write, and by doing this he removed discourse and debate from a purely verbal tradition to a more objectified, written one.
6. [6] Crow. M.M. 1999. Organizing principles for strategically realigning American research universities. Conference Presentation at Universities and the New Manifest Destiny. University of Georgia. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/research
7. [7] Wilshire, B. 1990. The Moral Collapse of the University: Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation. SUNY Press, Albany, NY. 1990.
8. [8] Edgerton, R. 1997.Higher Education White Paper. Pew Charitable Trusts.
9. [9] Wilshire, B. 1990. The Moral Collapse of the University: Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation. SUNY Press, Albany, NY.
10. [10] Veysey, L. 1965. The emergence of the
    American University. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
11. [11] Edgerton, R. 1997.Higher Education White Paper. Pew Charitable Trusts.
12. [12] Crow. M.M. 1998.
13. [13] Crow. M.M. 1999. Organizing principles for strategically realigning American research universities. Conference Presentation at Universities and the New Manifest Destiny. University of Georgia. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/research
14. [14] Wilshire B. 1990. The Moral Collapse of the University: Professionalism, Purity, and Alienation. SUNY Press, Albany, NY.
15. [15] Dowie, M. 2001. American Foundations- An investigative history. The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
16. [16] Crow. M.M.
    1999. Organizing principles for strategically realigning American research
    universities. Conference Presentation at Universities and the New Manifest
    Destiny. University of Georgia. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/research
17. [17] Cortese, A.C.
18. [18] www.secondnature.org
19. [19] Lave, J. and Wenger, E. 1991. Situated Learning. Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridege, England. 138 pp.
20. [20] ‘Adopting innovation’ is synonymous with
    ‘progress’ and it is worth examining the underlying meaning of these terms. Progress is defined by the Oxford dictionary as “move forward or onward; be carried on; advance, develop” Its synonyms are ‘advance, headway, course, advancement, passage, proceeding, progression’. It appears that the word ‘progress’ did not enter general usage until about one thousand years ago. And the responsibility for this rests with the Christian churches who were engaged in reducing pagan rituals and beliefs in their constituents. These rituals tended to involve cyclical phenomena – day-night, the weeks and the phases of the moon, the seasons and the year – whereas the Christian ideal of Salvation required a linear notion of continual improvement of one’s self and soul. A component of sustainability requires that we recognize a need to reclaim recognition of some of these cyclical phenomena since many of these are based on ecological and natural realities. But doing so opens the possibility of sustainability being labelled ‘anti-progress’.
21. [21] Ewell, P. 1999. Imitation as Art - Borrowed Management Techniques in Higher Education. Change. Vol 31 (6).
22. [22] Ewell, P. 1999. Imitation as Art - Borrowed Management Techniques in Higher Education. Change. Vol 31
    (6).
23. [23] AtKisson, A. 1999. Believing Cassandra. An Optimist Looks at a Pessimist’s World. Chelsea Green. 237 pp.
24. [24] AtKisson, A. 1999. Believing Cassandra. An Optimist Looks at a Pessimist’s World. Chelsea Green. 237 pp.
25. [25] Rogers, E.M. 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. Fourth Edition. The Free Press. 519 pp.
26. [26] Epper. R.M. 1999. Applying Benchmarking to Higher Education - Some Lessons from Experience Change. Vol 31 (6).
27. [27] /a> Balderston, F. 1995. Managing Today’s University. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
28. [28] Balderston, F. 1995. Managing Today’s University. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
29. [29] Cortese, A.C. The need for a new human perspective. www.secondnature.org/vision/vision.nsf/

The Background

Science has a special place in the expert-role in public persuasion in the late twentieth century, perhaps rivaled only in history by the control exerted by the Christian Church in the Middle ages in Europe.[1] The Church was able to allege that it was able to unearth the “Truth” from insights into a reality that was totally independent. This authority was believed to have been grounded in the very nature of everything. The growth of modern science and the reformation began to erode this once infallible position and Christians became restive over the abuse of power both within and by the church. The “One Church” became many and science and reason was ascendant. Sensory observation provided the data and reason made it reasonable. Public experience and rationality became the cornerstones of truth, and scientific and objective became synonymous - “If I could see the yellow Forsythia bush, you probably could as well”. The subjective was relegated to the unscientific and even beyond the scope of reason. In the early debate over the ozone issue we see the essence of this argument played out in a strictly late-twentieth century issue. There are echoes in this story of Galileo and many of the other subsequent challenges to all types of “current dogma.”

The Context

The biosphere of our planet is protected from the harmful effects of Ultra-Violet (UV) rays in sunlight by a thin layer of ozone gas floating approximately 12 to 50 km (8 to 30 miles) above the surface of the earth[2]. In 1974 scientific evidence was published which suggested that chlorine atoms released from industrially-made chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) a commonly used aerosol and refrigerant gas, could float up to the stratosphere, cleave these ozone molecules and degrade this thin but crucial protective screen[3]. This idea remained a chemical hypothesis until 1985 when significant and unpredicted losses in stratospheric ozone were discovered over 26 million km2 covering Antarctica in the Southern Hemisphere. In the intervening decade from 1974 to 1985, the CFC-producing industry had engaged in a complex effort to discredit the relevant scientific process, distract policy makers and the public while claiming that CFCs were completely safe. The first ozone-hole report and other unequivocal evidence from atmospheric science gave strong impetus to the signing of an international environmental treaty, the Montreal Protocol (1987), to control the use of CFCs. In this period industry appeared to completely change its position, moved to find safe substitutes and seemed to comply with public and scientific opinion. Except that initially certain CFC compounds were simply renamed in an attempt to escape the strictures of the Montreal and subsequent agreements. The Montreal Accords have been celebrated as the most successful of more than a dozen international scientific treaties signed during the past two decades. It is unique for several reasons: in allowing for new scientific data to change some provisions, for the short amount of time it took to develop, and it was formulated on the basis of predictive science rather than in response to evidence of environmental damage[4]. Some public figures and opinion leaders such as Talk Show host Rush Limbaugh still absolutely dispute the scientific evidence and something of an ozone backlash has developed in the US in particular[5].With the recent political shift in the US Congress there is even some discussion about targeting the Montreal Accords

In this paper I propose to examine some of the methods of persuasion employed by each group in this unique intersection of environmental science, public policy and the industrial market-place.

A structure for the analysis

The overall frame for this discourse was set in place early on, in fact almost as soon as the initial scientific evidence was presented. Industry in the US challenged the implications of the findings and then resorted to a prolonged dispute with the scientific community. They poured millions of dollars into this enterprise and successfully held off governmental regulation. The response in Britain was slightly different. Industry and government had much closer links in the UK and the scientific community had a more muted response. I will frame this discourse as a two level negotiation. At level 1 there was Industry, Scientists and Government regulators engaged in a three-way discussion, with some overlapping interests between Scientists and Government and a range of parties with different interests at level 2, including the Congress, the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) and other government groups, the public, other scientists and environmental Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The interchange between these two levels has been characterized by framing on both sides, propaganda and official and unofficial persuasion. The discourse was complex and shifted focus with each new development. Because of its particular success and global acceptance, the Montreal Protocol has been reviewed through a number of analytical lenses, including Environmental Science, Politics and International Diplomacy. I have chosen to treat it in relatively little detail in this discussion. No analysis has attempted to examine how the debate was framed in persuasion and propaganda terms, as a common underlying structure.

The chemical compounds

CFCs were first developed in the 1930s by General Motors as a replacement for Ammonia and Sulphur dioxide, both hazardous compounds and used as refrigerants in the refrigeration industry. CFCs are non-toxic, inert, and easy to liquefy. The most widely used CFCs (CFC-11 and CFC-12) have the highest ozone depletion capacity and estimated life spans of 63 and 107 years. The range varies from 27 years for CFC-22 to 385 years for CFC-115. After the signing of the Montreal Protocol, a new naming system appeared. On 5 January 1988, Du Pont first publicly used the term “hydrogen chlorofluorocarbon” (HCFC)[6]. During the negotiations to the agreement distinctions were made between the various chemicals and parties chose to regulate only the most potent of the ozone depletors. HCFCs such as HCFC-22 contains hydrogen atoms and are less inert than CFCs, tending to decompose more rapidly in the lower atmosphere before they can rise high enough to reach the ozone layer. The industry then began to adopt a nomenclature with three divisions: fully halogenated CFCs; partially halogenated CFCs containing some hydrogen atoms, hence HCFCs; and, non-chlorine containing CFCs called HFCs. The Montreal Protocol regulates only the fully halogenated CFCs and their brominated relatives (halons-1211, -1301 and - 2402). The numbering system is non-standard but consistent and refers to the number of hydrogen, carbon and fluorine atoms.

The Scientists and the science

Mario Molina joined Sherwood Rowland’s laboratory as a Post-Doctoral fellow in October 1973. Rowland had not studied CFCs before but had some money to channel towards some work on these compounds. He proposed to Molina that they follow up on their mutual interest in the fate of CFCs under UV. They agreed to a general methodology and then set about doing the project. They determined that there were no significant sinks for these compounds below the stratosphere and they confirmed some other measurements of the rates at which CFCs absorb UV. They determined that CFCs drift in the atmosphere for between 40 and 150 years before that are eventually broken down by UV. They had also determined that when CFCs breakdown a free atom of chlorine is produced. They almost published their findings up to this point and then decided to ask one more question: what happened to this chlorine atom? Within three days and after a large amount of calculations Molina found that each chlorine atom could react catalytically with “tens of hundreds of thousands” of ozone molecules and destroy them [7] (p. 181): they had formulated the crux of the paper that they would submit to the journal Nature. They spent the next three months conferring with colleagues to ensure that they had not overlooked some crucial aspect. Rowland wrote the paper in early January 1974 and submitted as planned. They realized the portentous nature of their discovery and deliberately chose to submit through the peer-review process. The paper finally appeared on 28 June 1974, delayed by the difficulty of finding suitably qualified reviewers. The journal requested that news of this theory be embargoed up until publication date. Nervously expectant, Rowland and Molina were stunned by the media silence: the problem was too complicated for the public to grasp the implications. Finally, at a press conference at the American Chemical Society meetings in September 1974, the media took up the story.

What the government did

The convening of a group called “Committee on the Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere” (IMOS) constituted proof that the White House had taken the problem seriously. A one-day hearing was scheduled on 27 February 1975, and Rowland and Harvard’s Michael McElroy, a renowned atmospheric chemist, disagreed about the problem: McElroy thought that the theory was in some doubt and the problem was not so severe as Rowland and Molina would suggest. Another chemist pointed out that the real issue was that this was a public policy problem and not a scientific disagreement. The IMOS committee heads, Carroll Pegler Bastian and Warren Muir, then set about figuring out the jurisdiction problems that would have to be unraveled around formulating and implementing policy related to CFCs in the Federal Government. They released a report in June 1975 that handed a definitive directive to the National Academy of Science (NAS) to determine whether CFCs were hazardous or not. They suggested that aerosols cans containing CFCs be labeled as such, and recommended that Congress pass the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to be able to control CFCs as a hazardous substance. The IMOS report dismayed the industry but it responded characteristically: Du Pont scientist Richard Ward told the Los Angeles Times that the “report essentially concurs with the industry’s position that there is no appreciable danger in continued use of the fluorocarbon compounds while studies are completed”[8] (p. 41). The US reaction was portrayed as premature and overblown by the British Science weekly New Scientist. The US House and Senate commenced hearings to try to develop legislation to clean up the bureaucratic entanglement. Several hearings were held in 1975 -1976. Dale Bumpers employed William Moomaw as a scientific advisor. Moomaw had a Ph.D. in photochemistry and was able to assess the scientific arguments thoroughly. He remarked on one occasion “It was interesting to me as a scientist to hear [industry representatives] refer to it disparagingly as “the theory”. To a scientist a theory is sort of the pinnacle of the intellectual accomplishment. To industry, theory meant nothing more than your speculation versus my speculation”[9] (p. 45). Some subcommittee members were suspicious of the scientists motives. They wondered if they weren’t trying to drum up money for research. Bumpers got a commitment from Roy Schuyler about the extent of proof necessary before DuPont would withdraw Freons: “if it were not refutable, and if the data were reasonable and right and could be sustained, they would withdraw it”[10]. Eventually an amendment to the Clean Air Act was passed giving the EPA authority to regulate the chemicals if they were found to be dangerous. During the periods 1974-76, 1981, and 1987-1990 Du Pont testified a total of 8 times (on average once per year) at house hearings on this issue. In contrast, the NCA testified about acid-rain issues 21 times in 64 hearings over the same period of time.[11]

The Council for Atmospheric Sciences was an industry group organized to lobby for CFC production, fearing that state legislation could snowball into national legislation. Once the IMOS report was released the Industry had to take stock. The American Chemical Society (ACS) meeting in April 1975 had a special session on Ozone and CFC and it ran all day. The intense media coverage portrayed this as an Industry vs. Science battle and stoked the fires. Industry people whose jobs were threatened couldn’t understand why these compounds were suddenly a threat after they had been around for all these years. Many blamed the Media for exaggeration. The first ACS Press conference on the Rowland-Molina theory the previous year had Du Pont Scientists interrupting other speakers and dominating the proceedings. They asked combative non-media types of questions. Molina had learnt by this meeting how to handle the Press more effectively. He was more gentle and humorous. Rowland was infinitely patient with reporters and very able to speak their language. The press conference was a success for scientists - one reporter even acknowledged that they had a field day. Because of this, both were accused by Industrialist Robert Abplanalp of having run to the media. He saw their advocacy as inappropriate for a scientist and even complained in writing to the Chancellor of the University of California, Robert Aldrich, complaining about Rowland. Aldrich defended Rowland as doing the job he was paid to do.

In July 1975 researchers in the Antarctic using high-flying aircraft and balloon-borne measuring devices, detected CFCs 15 miles above the earth in the stratosphere confirming that the CFCs drifted up through the troposphere. These findings also provided partial confirmation that UV was cleaving the molecules because the amount of CFCs declined with altitude in the stratosphere almost exactly as predicted by the computer models[12]. A few months later several groups of scientists confirmed that CFCs dissociated by Ultra-violet light and gave off chlorine. This new evidence was then reported to the Senate Subcommittee on the Upper Atmosphere in September. Industry’s only remaining argument was that there was no proof that chlorine would initiate a chain reaction that would destroy huge amounts of ozone. Detection of chlorine oxide would be definitive proof. Then a controversy arose about the role of chlorine nitrate. Chlorine nitrate could be formed when chlorine oxide was linked with nitrogen oxides. By tying up chlorine, less ozone would be destroyed than the amount predicted by Rowland and Molina. This was brought to public attention by Rowland and Molina themselves and they were applauded for having the courage to be self-critical. Rowland later explained,”We understood that we had a terrific responsibility, because we did not see sufficient scientific competence in our opposition. If there were flaws in the theory, we would have to find them ourselves.”[13] (p. 207).

This delayed the NAS report-back for five months and legislators wanted a strong go-ahead to act on amendments to the Clean-Air Act. The NAS released two reports: One came out clearly supporting the hypothesis of Rowland and Molina that CFCs were going to damage the ozone layer, producing losses of between 2 and 20 percent and that more UV light would reach the earth’s surface as a result. The second report advised the government that it should wait two more years and gather more evidence before issuing regulations. The industry’s Council on Atmospheric Sciences placed an advertisement in newspapers around the country one week later, quoting the NAS report, that stated : ” ‘We wish to recommend against a decision to regulate at this time.’We agree!” [14] (p. 81). However, one month later the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed a phase-out of all non-essential uses of CFCs in food, drugs and cosmetics. The EPA followed suit with a similar announcement. Du Pont officials were outraged: “We find the FDA’s intent to establish a timetable for phasing out fluorocarbon aerosols astonishing. When NAS wrote in its report ‘we recommend against the decision to regulate as this time’, the academy clearly recommended against this kind of action that FDA is planning.”[15] (p.85). The regulations generally affected the spray can industry only and the aerosol industry suffered very little from the 1977 ban. Spray-can sales fell from about 3 billion to 2.3 billion.

The Montreal Protocol (1987)

The essence of these meetings was a carried over fight form the Vienna Framework Convention (1985). The EC/Japan/Soviet Union resisted a control protocol because they feared that it favored American Industries. The Toronto group (Canada, Nordic Countries, Switzerland and US) opposed the imposition of a capacity cap on the production. The capacity cap favored the EC because of excess capacity to continue expanding CFC use for another 20 years. It would also have had the effect of locking in market shares and so would have constituted a serious disadvantage to US industries, which were operating with little or no excess capacity. A combination of forceful diplomacy from the US and a change of heart on the part, notably, of the Soviet Union and Germany brought agreement on a control and reduction targets.

Changing names

One effect of changing the names during the Montreal Protocol meetings (1987) was to enable some companies to make claims which are somewhat confusing, perhaps intentionally. McDonalds, for example distributed literature stating that its foam food packaging “is manufactured without [emphasis in original]the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) which are thought to be harmful to the earth’s ozone layer”[16]. Some McDonalds packaging was, in fact, produced with HCFC-22, formerly called CFC-22, which is an ozone depleting chemical. Another example is provided by Du Pont’s marketing literature for a brand of aerosol propellants, “DYMEL”, one of which is HCFC-22. The literature contained the following statement: “Not regulated by federal laws restricting the use of chlorofluorocarbons in aerosols, Du Pont’s family of DYMEL propellants opens rich new opportunities for aerosol packagers. Environmentally safe and low in toxicity, DYMEL propellants can generate consumer preference and product marketability”[17] (p. 321). Moore observes that similar kinds of statements can be found on a wide range of consumer products, from cans of compressed HCFC-22 for cleaning electronic equipment to packages of CFC-22-blown foam products.

The Industry

The major industry players were Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) the largest CFC producer in Britain and Du Pont, the largest CFC producer in the USA.

The position of industry is astutely summarized in the following quote: “The difficulties in negotiating the Montreal Protocol had nothing to do with whether the environment was damaged or not. It was all who was going to gain an edge over whom; whether Du Pont would have an advantage over the European companies or not.”[18] In 1974 CFC industries generated $8 billion and employed 200 000 people[19]. According to Department of Commerce statistics for the same year the CFC production reached $500 million with a payroll of 600 000 jobs paying $6.7 billion. Another 1.5 million jobs were dependent on this industry.[20] In 1986 the annual value of goods and services dependent on CFCs exceeded $28 billion and more than 780 000 jobs were related to CFC uses[21]. They formed a lobbying organization called the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy in 1980. By the late fall in 1986 the Alliance had taken a clear strong stand against premature regulation. Throughout the intergovernmental and the international negotiations in 1986 and 1987 the Alliance publicized the likely cost to the American consumer of capping or banning CFC production and use. They employed a prestigious energy consulting firm, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett (PHB) to develop a range of estimates of the costs of regulating CFCs based on the types of limits under discussion. PHB came up with a report forecasting substantial economic dislocation, including declines in the performance and quality of some electronic parts to the elimination of some packaging businesses. Private American industries are mandated by Congress to be consulted by the State and Commerce Departments and the Office of the Special Trade Representative on most international trade negotiations. Ignoring a lobby group creates a real risk of not getting an agreement ratified. The chief US negotiator Richard Benedick had to make sure that he took the Alliance’s viewpoint into consideration even though he disagreed with the thrust of many of the statements made by them.[22]

How the Industry portrayed itself

From a scientific point of view, industry had very little ammunition after the release of the IMOS report in June 1975. The refrigerator industry, aerosols market, deodorant packagers all suffered. Shipments of aerosol cans were already down 25% in the first half of 1975. Industry came across looking like villains, while scientists on the side of the ban looked like the heroes. In May 1975 Sol Ganz, president of New York Bronze Powder Company received a letter from a young girl signed by twenty three of her friends. In it they told of their fears of getting cancer and that Susan’s horse was about to have a foal and the foal will be alive in the year 2000 and that she would have to shoot her, all because of spray cans. He attacked the aerosol industry for not effectively rebutting the anti-aerosol publicity.

Then in June the Johnson Wax Company, the fifth largest manufacturer of aerosol products, announced its decision to end use of all CFC propellants in aerosols “in the interests of our customers during a period of uncertainty”[23] (p.59). Johnson’s move was characterized by one industry official as an attempt to gain some market advantage. An advertisement appeared for a new product saying “Problem perspiration? Concerned about aerosols? Totally honest non-aerosol anti-perspirant deodorant is the answer”. Ads such as this were excoriated by editors of Aerosol Age. An ad for Mennen’s “get on the stick” was awarded the prize for the most obnoxious commercial. “What is most amazing about this crude performance is that it is sponsored by an old-line, highly respected and conservative company, which, incidentally has been a leading marketer of aerosols” noted an editor in the journal Soap/Cosmetics/Chemical Specialties.[24] NRDC, at the New York State hearings on banning aerosol spray cans, pointed out (this went into the public record) that stick deodorants were more economical and gave the consumers more for their money.[25]

During the summer of 1975, Industry used an erudite and outspoken British scientist and former editor of International Journal of Air Pollution, Richard Scorer, to bolster publicity. He was suspicious of “the theory” and labeled Molina and Rowland “doomsayers”. Rowland’s response to him was to note that he was good at attacking but had never published any scientific papers on the subject. He was booked by his publicity firm to debate McElroy on “The Firing Line” but his appearance was not a success for Industry: he was out of his league in the face of McElroy’s scientific expertise.

Industry was more successful at fighting state legislation on aerosol bans. Du Pont spent millions on full-page advertisements knowing that environmental and consumer groups could never match them. The ads carried the message that aerosols have made life better for everyone and “We believe in what US Law holds clearly and we cherish dearly: you are innocent until proven guilty.”[26] (p.62) By November 1975, industry was not doing very well. Sales of aerosol containing products were incontrovertibly down, and in polls the public was recognizing the danger of CFCs to the environment. More disturbing was the finding that there was a lack of faith in American business ethics. The industry responded by attacking the Consumer Product Safety Commission, calling it the newest monster created by congress.

The Trans-Atlantic connection

In 1975, R. Schuyler of Du Pont told a US Senate hearing that restrictions on CFCs “would cause tremendous economic dislocation”[27]. Producers in the US, responding to consumer pressure, had moved to develop new propellants before the 1978 aerosol ban and these substitutes proved to be more economical than CFCs. Somehow the European producers were able to persuade their governments that replacement was unfeasible. The threat of patchwork state regulations made the industry publicly favor federal legislation to reduce the disruption.[28] American firms appeared more concerned about their public image than Europeans. US producers also resented that European rivals had gained a competitive edge in the late 1970’s by blocking meaningful EC regulation. US industry was strongly opposed to an EPA proposal to freeze non-aerosol uses and they repeatedly urged the EPA to maintain a level playing field. In September 1986, less than 3 months before the scheduled start of negotiations, the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, a coalition of 500 US producer and user companies, unexpectedly came out supporting international regulation of CFCs. Reflecting differences within the business community, the statement did not specify sets of controls, recommending instead more scientific research, conservation and development of substitutes. This broke a transatlantic united front on the eve of talks and caused consternation in Europe. Some Europeans suspected that the US was using a scare to cloak commercial motives. They claimed that the US was endorsing CFC control to enter the profitable EC export markets with profitable substitutes. According to Benedick, this suspicion was unfounded - Du Pont admitted that it had ceased research into alternatives 5 years earlier[29]. The primary objective of the European companies was to dominate the market for as long as possible to avoid the costs of switching to other products. They thought that the US producers had acted in haste and had only themselves to blame. European producers had much closer ties to government, even to the point of being part of official delegations to protocol negotiations - compared to the US industry who went in the capacity of unofficial observers. Some EU industrialists were privately trivializing the ozone threat and were openly cynical about the objectives of the negotiations.[30]

A 1975 advertisement in the New York Times said “The ozone layer vs. the aerosol industry: Du Pont wants to see them both survive”[31] (p. 321).

Then in 1976: “Du Pont industry heavyweight, leader in the holy crusade to save the aerosol, champion of economic growth, jobs, and scientific certainty, and enemy of the “rule of witchcraft where, by definition, the accusation proves the charge,” seemed especially nonchalant. In 1976, Du Pont sold about $250 million in CFCs, of which “only” about $50 million worth was for use as an aerosol propellant, a company spokesman pointed out. “That means that fluorocarbons accounted for about three percent of Du Pont’s total sales of $8.36 billion in 1976,” the spokesman continued, “while the aerosol propellant business represented roughly 0.5 percent of total sales. It wasn’t very significant.”[32] (p. 213)

In London in March 1991, the environmental manager for Fluorochemicals for Du Pont gave a seminar entitled “Du Pont’s response to the Stratospheric Ozone Issue”. The chronology (Figure 1) shows the official tone. Du Pont hosts Global CFC Symposium — What happens to CFCs. The accompanying text to this slide reads as follows: “Du Pont and industry globally have responded to credible science with appropriate policy changes and actions to deal with stratospheric ozone protection. As illustrated by these two graphics, alternative products have been brought to commercial reality much faster than “business as usual”. Lets look at the highlights.” The impression is clearly intended that Du Pont “changed policy” in 1986 to limit CFC growth/global regulation. Each of the years from 1988 after the Montreal Protocol, Du Pont has opened a new substitutes plant somewhere in the US, Canada or Britain. The subtitle to this slide is Du Pont & Industry Leadership. This slide is loaded with a range of subtle and persuasion-loaded meanings. The intention is clearly to give the impression of Du Pont acting responsibly and responding to science. They did indeed do so after the first real evidence of a hole in 1986, but had marshaled sophisticated resistance at every turn up to that point. More interesting is the unsubstantiated “as illustrated by these two graphics ….faster than “business as usual”. The intriguing question is: What standard is this being measured against? The rest of the talk is devoted to an introduction to the selection of alternative fluorocarbons and how the relative use of these will affect the chlorine load and its reduction under different scenarios. Vogelsberg reemphasized that CFCs should be phased out as soon as possible i.e. “..as soon as safe substitutes can be made available. CFCs should be conserved to the maximum extent practical during the transition and HCFCs should be viewed as transition substances to allow the rapid CFC phaseout.” [33] (p. 6)

Environmental NGOs

These took on a stronger role once the protocol was signed. Alongside a general plan to increase awareness, Environmental NGOs internationally set about pressuring governments that signed the Protocol to drastically strengthen the agreement when they met in June 1990. In October 1987 at a meeting in Amsterdam 33 affiliated groups of Friends of the Earth International passed a resolution of highest priority to make ozone-layer protection a top priority campaign. They designed campaign initiatives to bring citizen pressure to bear on industries that use CFCs and simultaneously increased support for tougher government action. In 1987, approximately 500 million spray cans were produced that contained CFCs and about 12 of these were used by each consumer per year. Consumer were given a leaflet listing CFC-free products and on the day that this guide was released campaigners dressed as aerosol cans dumped a slogan made with spray cans on the doorstep of ICI, Britain’s largest producer of CFCs. By the end of that year 40 000 leaflets had been distributed. Similar campaigns were launched in the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Australia, France, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia and some other countries. An organizing effort in the Netherlands was so successful that within three months the national aerosol manufacturers agreed with the Environment Ministry to stop using CFCs by the end of 1989. In return the environmentalists promised to ease up on negative publicity. Attention was also brought to bear on polystyrene foam packaging. CFCs were used to blow these into foams for drinking cups, egg cartons and fast food containers. Other activity targeted McDonalds persuading them to change to non-CFC blown agents and then used this as leverage to challenge and successfully pressure other major fast food companies with adverse publicity announcements at the Montreal conference. Much of this kind of activity was organized by Friends of the Earth (USA), with involvement from Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council and Greenpeace. Their main goals were to educate the public and define a climate for tougher government action both domestically and internationally, by targeting domestic industrial sectors.[34]

The Public

On 1 February 1975, 43 million Americans watched the hit TV show All in the Family. The characters Mike and Gloria are arguing about having children. Mike did not want to bring children into a rapidly deteriorating world. Gloria pleaded that things were getting better. “Oh yeah,” replied Mike, picking up a can of her hair spray. “What about spray cans? Right here, this is a killer!…I read that there are gases inside these cans, Gloria, that shoot up in the air and destroy the ozone.”

Analysis

An essential ingredient in trying to unravel the details of this event is to understand the implicit power of the sophistication of the knowledge involved. Atmospheric science is extremely complex requiring a high level of understanding of atmospheric chemistry, complex mathematical modeling, climatology and oceanography. The concepts that were under dispute were all without exception very difficult to translate into non-specialist terms. Points of disagreement were embedded in this complex knowledge system and were equally difficult to translate. Translation, when it was attempted, usually resulted in some trivialization of the issue, and opened up an opportunity for exploitation to the advantage of one or other point of view. An example of this division: “the ozone debate” ([35] p.78).

The Backlash

The basis of the backlash revolves around concentrations of natural sources of chlorine in the stratosphere. The central question revolves around how these compare to man-made sources (CFCs) and the claim is that CFCs are insignificant. This claim is made in a book by Rogelio Maduro and Ralf Schauerhammer and taken up by former Atomic Energy Commissioner Dixy Lee Ray and, in turn, talk-show host Rush Limbaugh. Maduro and Schauerhammer calculated that 650 million tons of chlorine enter the atmosphere annually from sources on the surface of the earth, the majority from seawater. CFCs account for a mere 750 000 tons annually. Scientists both dispute Maduro and Schauerhammer’s figures and doubt whether this chlorine reaches the stratosphere. The reason for this unlikely scenario is that chlorine from natural sources is water soluble and so gets washed out of the atmosphere by rain. CFCs, however, are inert and stable and float up to the stratosphere where the chlorine atoms are released by UV radiation. When charged that these natural sources of chlorine don’t hold up under scrutiny, these backlash critics contend that volcanoes are an additional source. Here again they have chosen to misrepresent the available information. Volcanologists have made a range of estimates of the amount of chlorine produced from a volcanic eruption but, regardless of how much they might produce, the plumes from erupting volcanoes are several kilometers below the base of the stratosphere and do not penetrate it at all. Rowland asserts that atmospheric scientists decided 15 years ago to reject volcanoes as a significant source of chlorine for the stratosphere[36]. Ray, in her book Trashing the Planet seized on a quote from a paper by the volcanologist David Johnston in the journal Science. He suggested that “the eruption of the Bishop Tuff….in California 700 000 years ago may have injected 289 million tons of hydrogen chloride into the stratosphere, equivalent to about 570 times the 1975 world industrial production of chlorine fluorocarbons.” She mis-attributes the numbers to the 1976 Mount St. Augustine eruption and Limbaugh, in turn, mis-attributes similar numbers to the Mount Pinatubo eruption. Limbaugh explains that he gets his facts from Ray’s book which he describes as “the most footnoted, documented book” he has ever read. Maduro is an associate editor of 21st Century & Technology, a magazine published by supporters of Lyndon LaRouche. 21st Century has circulated a petition citing Maduro’s arguments and calling for the repeal of the Montreal Protocol. A Nobel prize-winning chemist at Texas A&M, Derek Barton, is among those in the scientific community who have signed it.

Maduro and Schauerhammer have written a book entitled The Holes in the Ozone Scare: The Scientific Evidence That the Sky Isn’t Falling also published by 21st Century. Atmospheric researchers who have read parts of the book said that they could see how non-experts could be swayed by the arguments. According to these scientists, the book is based on out-dated scientific papers, and selective results taken out of context. Rowland described the book as “a good job of collecting all the bad papers [in the field] in one place”[37] (p. 1581). Maduro’s response is that Rowland and other critical scientists “have systematically ignored all the massive research which debunks elements of their theory.”[38] (p. 1581). Maduro and Limbaugh brand any formal attempt to debate them by researchers as part of a massive conspiracy to ignore or bury any contradictory findings to their theory. In their book, Maduro and Schauerhammer accuse their opponents of deliberately distorting the facts about ozone research and of being “in top posts with command power over scientific journals and associations and, ultimately, public opinion.”[39] (p. 1582). Publicity materials for the book call for “overthrow of the murderous environmentalist regime now ruling our schools, governing institutions and the media” [40] (p. 6).

This backlash continues to develop even as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has released data for 1994 and 1995 showing that depletion over the poles had exceeded predicted rates of ozone loss for the past three years, along with record losses over Antarctica. Some models from National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) even suggest that ozone depletion is triggering self-reinforcing depletion cycles leading to geometric rates of losses. In 1993 vehicle manufacturers managed to bring pressure to bear on the Clinton Administration to persuade Du Pont to continue producing CFCs for a full year beyond the date on which they had publicly committed themselves to cease domestic manufacture. The reason given was that vehicle makers had not done sufficient work to find alternatives for automobile air-conditioners.

The Institute for Energy and Environment Research recently called for the worldwide elimination of HCFCs by 1996. Such demands are not well received by Du Pont nor by many of the parties to the Montreal Protocol. The Protocol is now pushing these substitutes, that it backed through a fund administered by the World Bank, to developing countries to help them circumvent the use of CFCs. But 75% of the grants went to projects that use CFCs and HCFCs, despite the Bank’s own advisors recommending cyclopentane, an ozone-safe compound with little global warming potential. A further twist in this situation is shown by the membership of the advisory panel on grant making to the Bank, the Ozone Operations Resource Group (OERG). It consists of seven representatives, all closely associated with the chemical industry, two of whom are employees of ICI. The dominance of the industry is also evident in the conference of the parties to the Montreal Accords, where economic terms rather than environmental terms dominate the discussion. Passacantando and Carothers quote one top US representative to the meeting as saying “[ozone depletion] is not an environmental issue. It’s an economic issue.”(p.7)

Passacantando and Carothers suggest that the highest priority for industry is to resist controls on HCFCs and other CFC substitutes. “In this, they have undoubtedly been well served by the mood of doubt and complacency engendered by the ozone backlash.”…. “it is time the environmental movement retook the initiative, countering the propaganda peddled by Limbaugh, Ray and Maduro, and exposing the agenda of those corporations who are now sheltering in the lee of the backlash.”(p. 7).

One final twist:

Du Pont recently approached Greenpeace with an offer to help deal with the backlash publicity if Greenpeace was willing to endorse some of the work Du Pont was doing trying to develop alternatives and its effort to convert the Industry to using them. Not surprisingly, Greenpeace declined.[41]

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9. [9]Roan, S. 1989. ibid.
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